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Abstract 
 
Objective: To examine spillovers from a federal policy, managed care market, and community 
perspective. 
 
Data Sources/Study Setting: We studied spillovers from a federal policy and managed care 
market perspective using the Health Care Utilization Project’s (HCUP) State Inpatient Database 
(SID), American Hospital Association (AHA) data, Interstudy Commercial Managed Care, and 
Area Health Resource File (AHRF). Medicare Advantage county-level payment schedules 
originate from CMS. We examined community uninsurance spillovers using 2011-2015 Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), the Area Health Resource File (AHRF), and the Small Area 
Health Insurance Estimator (SAHIE).  
 
Study Design: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and difference-in-difference regression analyses 
were used to examine a federal policy spillover on hospital readmissions. We used OLS and 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation to examined Medicare Advantage (MA) spillovers on 
Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) hospital readmissions. We used logistic regression to examine 
community uninsurance spillovers on the privately insured.  
 
Principal Findings: After the HRRP, Medicare FFS saw a decrease in 30-day preventable 
condition- and all-cause readmissions. Medicare Advantage saw a positive spillover after the 
HRRP. MA market penetration has no effect on Medicare FFS hospital readmissions. High 
community uninsurance rates are associated with less access to behavioral health related 
outpatient/office-based and prescription utilization.  
 
Conclusions: HRRP had a positive spillover on MA hospital all-cause readmissions. MA market 
penetration has no effect on Medicare FFS readmissions. High levels of community uninsurance 
are associated with poorer access to outpatient/office-based and prescription behavioral related 
services.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Overview and Structure of the Dissertation 
SPILLOVER THEORY: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF PROVISIONS IN THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
 
 
By Robert Tyler Braun, Ph.D., M.S. 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.  
 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2018 
 
 
 
Director: Peter Cunningham, Ph.D. 
Professor, Department of Health Behavior and Policy  
 
 
This dissertation is comprised of three empirical papers surrounding one essential theme: 
spillovers. The three papers examined spillovers from three different perspectives: spillovers 
within hospitals, managed care spillovers, and spillovers on the community level. The main 
databases used in these papers are: (a) State Inpatient Databases (SIDs) from the Health Care 
Utilization Project (HCUP) and (b) the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data. The 
SID contains detailed information on the diagnoses and conditions associated with the treatment 
of patients in a given hospital. The SID tracks the primary source of payment and basic 
demographic information. The MEPS is the most comprehensive source of nationally 
representative data on individual health care utilization, expenditures, and insurance coverage of 
the U.S. non-institutionalized population. The variables of interests in this dissertation include 
  2 
topics on quality of care outcomes such as 30-day preventable readmissions, access to behavioral 
health services, and other relevant ideas.  
The first paper (Chapter 2) examines analytically and conceptually how the Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) may pressure not only how hospitals reduce 
readmissions for its intended population (Medicare fee-for-service), but also beneficiaries who 
have Medicare Advantage or private insurance. Conceptually, the HRRP creates an economic 
incentive for hospitals to reduce Medicare fee-for-service 30-day preventable readmissions or be 
fined if they do not meet standard benchmarks. As a result, hospitals must react to the HRRP by 
organizing and changing practice behaviors to reduce preventable readmissions. Under the 
assumption that hospitals and providers are unlikely to know a patient’s payer status when he/she 
enters the hospital for a readmission, all patients receive the same care regardless of insurance 
status. As a result, adjustments in provider behavior to reduce Medicare fee-for-service 
readmissions will also be experienced by Medicare Advantage and privately insured plan 
holders. This is known as a spillover. Analytically, we examined this by isolating the HRRP on 
Medicare fee-for-service, Medicare Advantage, and privately insured preventable 30-day 
condition specific and all-cause readmissions. 
The second paper presents (Chapter 3) data on spillovers from a managed care market 
perspective. We studied how Medicare Advantage penetration affected quality of care for 
Medicare fee-for-service and Medicare Advantage patients. We used 30-day preventable 
condition specific and all-cause readmissions to gauge whether Medicare fee-for-service and 
Medicare Advantage hospital quality of care varied by Medicare Advantage penetration. 
Conceptually, when managed care is the dominant insurance at a hospital or provider’s practice, 
the more influence it has on provider practice patterns. Since managed care selectively contracts, 
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leverages a large integrated and coordinated network, and uses rigorous forms of utilization 
review to reduce utilization and costs, the expectation of fewer readmissions and higher quality 
of care for Medicare Advantage patients seems reasonable. Furthermore, greater Medicare 
Advantage penetration may also change the quality of care for Medicare fee-for-service patients 
because of managed care influence over provider practice patterns. Like previous studies, we 
isolated exogenous increases in Medicare Advantage enrollment and traced the effects of greater 
managed care penetration on hospital quality of care by using Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Service (CMS) county-level Medicare Advantage payment schedule as an instrumental variable 
for Medicare Advantage penetration rates. We examined this instrumental variable and its 
association with preventable 30-day condition specific and all-cause readmissions.  
Paper 3 (Chapter 4) examines spillovers from a community perspective. The objective of 
this paper was to investigate the effect of community uninsurance rates on access to behavioral 
health services for individuals with continuous employer-sponsored insurance. Spillover effects 
associated with community uninsured rates have been a major concern in the U.S. since the early 
2000’s. Conceptually, over the long-term, high-uninsured rates could negatively affect access to 
care for both the insured and uninsured due to the lack of community resources available to build 
provider capacity and thus increase health care access. Analytically, we examined adults with 
continuous employer-sponsored insurance who had mental health problems and we examined 
how greater community-level uninsured rates affected their access to behavioral health services. 
Behavioral health services are defined by whether a person had (1) a mental health related 
emergency department or inpatient encounter, (2) mental health related outpatient or office-based 
encounter, or (3) was prescribed a medication for a mental health related issue.  
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Contribution 
The first paper contributes to present spillover literature by creating a formal spillover 
conceptual framework that does not exist in the current literature. This framework can be used 
for the HRRP policy and it applies to other studies examining the influence of federal and state 
policies on certain populations. Furthermore, this is the first study to examine spillovers of the 
HRRP by exclusively separating Medicare Advantage and private payers. Additionally, to our 
knowledge at this time, this study leverages data from more states than any other study 
examining the spillovers of the HRRP. Our results indicate similar conclusions as another study, 
but finds that hospitals may not be targeting condition-specific readmissions and individual 
payers, but instead are adjusting practice patterns to reduce all readmissions, regardless of payer 
status.  
 The second paper follows the analytical strategies and conceptual frameworks of several 
other studies. However, this paper contributes to the conceptual framework of how Medicare 
Advantage penetration may influence Medicare fee-for-service quality of care as it pertains to 
readmissions. Like similar studies, we find no evidence of Medicare Advantage penetration 
spillover on Medicare fee-for-service preventable readmission outcomes. In contrast to other 
studies, we find that Medicare Advantage penetration has little to no effect on Medicare 
Advantage readmissions. To our knowledge, we assert, regardless of the analytical approach 
used (ordinary least squares or instrumental variable estimation), that Medicare Advantage 
penetration has no affect on Medicare fee-for-service and Medicare Advantage preventable 
readmissions.  
 Lastly, the third paper contributes to community-level spillover research in several ways. 
This paper is the first known to examine the association of community-level uninsured rates and 
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behavioral health access. Secondly, using a report from the Institute of Medicine in 2003 as the 
foundation of our conceptual framework, we attempt to reconcile why other community-level 
spillover studies have different results. We concluded that community-level spillover analyses 
should be thought of in one of two ways: the long-term or short-term. The conceptual framework 
in this paper attempts to distinguish the two perspectives by explaining that short-term 
expansions may generate negative spillovers, while long-term effects may lead to positive 
spillovers. Short-term increases in community uninsurance could lead to temporary decreases in 
access to care for those who were already insured, as the health system did not have time to meet 
increased demand. These negative spillovers will eventually dissipate over the long-term, as 
higher coverage rates of insurance increase community resources and help build provider 
capacity. Our analytical strategy attempted to look at spillovers over the long-term by using 
county-level and year fixed effects to look at community uninsurance rates and behavioral health 
access over the course of time. We found that high levels of community uninsurance—as 
compared to low levels of community uninsurance was associated with a lower probability of 
outpatient or office-based mental health related visits, and a lower probability of mental health 
related prescription utilization. 
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Chapter 2: The Medicare Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program: Spillovers Into the 
Private Insurance Market 
 
 
Abstract 
Objective: To explore spillover effects of the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program 
(HRRP) on hospital Medicare Advantage and privately insured beneficiaries. 
 
Data Sources/Study Setting: Health Care Utilization Project’s (HCUP) State Inpatient Database 
(SID) administrative claims data to calculate condition-specific thirty-day preventable 
readmissions. American Hospital Association (AHA) data, Interstudy Commercial Managed 
Care, and Area Health Resource File (AHRF) were used to determine hospital, managed care, 
and county-level characteristics.  
 
Study Design: Ordinary Least Squares and difference-in-difference regression analyses were 
used to estimate the effect of the HRRP on Medicare and the spillover effect on Medicare 
Advantage and private insurance condition-specific and all-cause thirty-day preventable 
readmissions. Findings were compared across payer type. 
 
Principal Findings: Overall, hospitals experienced a significant 1.73% and 3.11% decrease in 
Medicare congestive heart failure (CHF) and pneumonia (PN) thirty-day preventable 
readmissions compared to the privately insured after the HRRP, respectively. There were no 
differences between Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage for condition-specific targeted 
readmissions. Hospitals displayed a 1% decrease in Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage all-
cause readmissions after the HRRP, suggesting a positive spillover. There was no spillover for 
private insurance.  
 
Conclusions: In general, the HRRP may have created a positive spillover for Medicare 
Advantage and hospitals may be reducing readmissions through a comprehensive approach. 
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Introduction 
Preventing avoidable readmissions on Medicare represents an opportunity to improve 
patient quality of care and outcomes, and bends the medical cost curve (Jencks, Williams, and 
Coleman 2009; Medpac Commission 2007). Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the U.S. 
Congress developed new financial incentives and penalties to increase health care system 
performance. Medicare’s Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP) designates the 
reduction of avoidable readmissions as a target for health care cost savings and authorizes the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to lower payments to hospitals with high 
risk-standardized rates of 30-day readmissions. The U.S. Congress implemented this policy as a 
response to control the costs associated with Medicare readmissions. Hospitals could be 
penalized up to 2% in the first year of the policy and 3% in the second and subsequent years by 
CMS withholding Medicare inpatient payments. Penalty readmission thresholds are calculated 
by retrospectively examining a hospital’s past three years of readmission claims data prior to 
HRRP. Penalties vary by hospital and are executed relative to staying under the expected 
calculated threshold. Hospitals that exceed the threshold are penalized by a reduction in 
payments across all Medicare admissions, not just those that resulted in readmissions. The HRRP 
started penalizing hospitals for excess preventable readmission for Congestive Heart Failure 
(CHF), Pneumonia (PN), and Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) in October of 2012. Targeted 
readmission conditions were expanded in 2015 to include chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD) and total knee and hip replacement. According to one study, in the third year of the 
HRRP, 78% of hospitals were penalized for excess readmissions, totaling $428 million (Boccuti 
and Casillas 2015). 
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Recent studies found reductions in Medicare readmission rates during the HRRP 
implementation period for targeted conditions (Demiralp, He, and Koenig 2017; Zuckerman et 
al. 2016; Carey and Lin 2015; Barrett et al. 2015). A study conducted by Desai et al. (2016) 
found hospitals penalized by the HRRP had greater reductions in targeted readmissions than 
those not penalized. Another study found hospitals that were poorest performing pre-HRRP had 
the greatest reduction of HRRP related readmissions (Wasfy et al. 2016).  
Other recent studies examined the relationship between the HRRP and spillovers through 
investigation of nontargeted conditions, hospital length of stay, and its effects on payers other 
than Medicare fee-for-service (Carey and Lin 2015; Zuckerman et al. 2016; Mellor, Daly, and 
Smith 2017; Demiralp, He, and Koenig 2017; Desai et al. 2016). Carey and Lin (2015) found an 
estimated 1-percentage point decrease in nontargeted readmissions for the state of New York. 
Furthermore, Zuckerman and authors (2016) reported a 2-percentage-point reduction from a 
nationwide sample in nontargeted conditions after the HRRP implementation. Demirlap, He, and 
Koeing (2017) reported that hospitals in California and Florida with the largest reductions in 
targeted Medicare readmissions experienced higher reductions in nontargeted Medicare 
readmissions and the HRRP had no spillover on non-Medicare patients. Mellor, Daly, and Smith 
(2016) found no changes in AMI-related length of stays for hospitals in Virginia after the HRRP. 
Desai et al. (2016) found decreases in nontargeted readmissions by variation in hospital 
performance. While these findings suggest mixed evidence of spillovers associated with the 
HRRP, more research is needed to better understand the extent of such spillovers and the full 
effects of the HRRP.  
This study contributes to prior literature on the effects of HRRP in several ways. First, 
while prior literature investigated the effect of HRRP on the non-Medicare population in one or 
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two states, this study used claims data from five different states located in different regions of the 
U.S. in an attempt to make findings more generalizable. Second, other studies failed to 
disentangle HRRP’s spillover by type of insurance; this work examined readmission changes in 
Medicare FFS, private payers, and Medicare Advantage separately, and then jointly tested the 
effects of the HRRP between these payers. Fourth, we presented a formal conceptual framework, 
which offered a foundation for considering the design features of the HRRP, as well as factors 
that influenced how hospitals responded to incentives and whether the HRRP was successful in 
reaching its stated goals. The framework can also be used to guide discussions about the design 
and implementation of existing spillover research and those in development and to define a 
structured agenda for evaluating spillover theory, with the explicit goal of developing knowledge 
to improve the understanding of spillovers in health care delivery.  
Conceptual Framework 
This formal spillover conceptual framework for this study revolved around several key 
assumptions—incentive (i.e., revenue potential of the HRRP penalty, improving quality of care), 
predisposing (i.e., hospital characteristics), and enabling factors (i.e., patient factors) that drove 
the incentive by medical providers to improve patient quality of care (Dudley et al. 1998; Frølich 
et al. 2007; Dranove and White 1998; Dranove et al. 2003). Not only were these factors 
associated with direct patient outcomes, they could contribute to spillovers as well. In past 
studies, researchers examined how policy actions designed to affect one payer type 
unintentionally affected other payer types (i.e., spillover effects). However, there is a shortage of 
evidence as to how federal government financial pressures and payment reductions in relation to 
readmissions spill over into several insurance markets.  
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Spillovers can be either positive or negative. Moreover, there could be no spillover at all. 
A positive spillover indicates that the HRRP induces hospitals to respond by adjusting quality of 
care (readmissions) not only for Medicare patients but also for other (private or Medicare 
Advantage) payer markets. To the extent that hospitals do not differentiate care between patients, 
all types of payers should see a similar reduction in readmissions and increase in quality of care. 
In the context of HRRP, a positive spillover indicates that hospitals respond by adjusting care for 
Medicare and to some degree for other payer markets. If the HRRP creates a positive spillover, 
then based on the aforementioned example and previous research findings, both types of payers 
should have a lower risk of readmission after the HRRP. 
In contrast, a negative spillover is a possible outcome. This takes place when hospitals 
differentiate patients by payer and provide different levels of care or focus only on improving 
areas of care that by measure and incentive of the HRRP, while ignoring a subsample of 
necessary services and patients. This results in variations in quality of care across patients in the 
same hospital due to time and resource constraints and profitability of a patient. If a negative 
spillover takes place, a hospital can divert resources originally in use by one payer and redirect 
them to another payer (Dranove and White 1998). In this example, assuming hospitals have a 
fixed budget, more time and resources are shifted away from private payers or Medicare 
Advantage and allocated to Medicare FFS for increased discharge planning, patient education, 
and follow-ups to care, which would result in a lower quality of care to private payers or 
Medicare Advantage and a higher risk of readmission. This suggests that hospitals with the 
largest reductions in Medicare readmissions would have smaller or no reductions in privately 
insured readmissions. However, evidence of this negative resource and effort allocation spillover 
is mixed (Demiralp, He, and Koenig 2017; Carey and Lin 2015).  
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The overarching theme to the conceptual framework in Figure 1 is that the HRRP 
financial incentives of the policy/penalty or other factors drive hospitals to reduce readmissions. 
Since hospitals must respond to the HRRP by reforming care structures or processes to reduce 
Medicare readmissions, privately insured or Medicare Advantage patients may experience the 
same improvement in preventable readmissions. If the quality of care a Medicare FFS, privately 
insured, and Medicare Advantage patient receives is the same, there should be no statistical 
difference in the rate change between Medicare, privately insured, and Medicare Advantage 
preventable readmissions (Dranove and White 1998). The identification strategy assumes that 
financial penalties of the HRRP, which are based on readmissions (quality performance) for 
Medicare patients only, are reflected in quality of care received by all patients. This is a 
reasonable assumption because many, if not all, hospitals’ responses to the HRRP financial 
penalties likely require improvements that affect all patients; it is probably not feasible for 
hospitals to specifically target Medicare FFS patients for quality improvement activities (medical 
staff are unlikely aware of payer status). Even if targeting were possible, it would be considered 
dangerous to patients and highly unethical. Therefore, resources are unlikely to shift away from 
private payers and care related to readmissions resembles a public good (Ryan and Blustein 
2011; Dranove and White 1998; Chen et al. 2010). We expected that due to the HRRP, hospitals 
and providers would change practice behavior to reduce readmissions, and that they did not 
discriminate by payer status. Therefore, we hypothesized: 
H1: Medicare FFS will see a decrease in condition-specific and all-cause readmissions 
after the HRRP.   
H2: Medicare Advantage will see a decrease in condition-specific and all-cause 
readmissions after the HRRP 
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H3: Private payers will see a decrease in condition-specific and all-cause readmissions 
after the HRRP.  
Methods 
Data Source and Sample Population Overview 
The primary data used in the analyses came from the Health Care Utilization Project’s 
State Inpatient Databases (HCUP). The databases contain detailed information on the diagnoses 
and conditions associated with index admissions/readmissions; the treatments received for the 
universe of patients in a given state; primary source of payment; and basic demographic 
information such as age, gender, and race/ethnicity. The analyses were limited to the following 
states for the years 2009–2013: California, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, and New York because 
they differentiated between Medicare fee-for-service and other types of insurance payment. The 
study sample consisted of all urban general hospitals that operated between 2009 and 2013. 
To measure the capacity and availability of medical and hospital resources, we derived 
the county-level commercial managed care penetration rates from the Interstudy managed care 
enrollment dataset. County-level household income, and the percentage insured came from the 
Area Health Resource File (AHRF). We used the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual 
surveys to measure hospital characteristics and to calculate hospital competition. 
We excluded the year 2011 from the analytical sample, as it coincided with the 
implementation of various components of the ACA and the anticipation of HRRP. Omitting 2011 
allowed observation of the full effects of the HRRP—specifically, any partial responses after the 
ACA passage but before the penalties went into full effect (Mellor, Daly, and Smith 2017). We 
then selected hospital discharges: Medicare FFS and Advantage patients 65 years or older, and 
privately insured patients between the ages of 45 and 64. We followed details in the construction 
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of readmission rates found in the technical reports prepared by CMS (CMS 2014). Furthermore, 
individuals who died during admission, dual-eligible Medicare patients, and those who had a 
planned readmission were excluded. We also excluded hospitals that had fewer than 30 
discharges (Chen et al. 2010).  
Outcome: Targeted Readmissions 
Dependent variables are presented in rates. There were fifteen outcome variables (three 
for each type of readmission): CHF, PN, and AMI Medicare FFS readmission rates; CHF, PN, 
and AMI Medicare Advantage readmission rates; CHF, PN, and AMI private preventable 
readmission rates; and the difference between the Medicare and private preventable readmission 
rates. The difference in the preventable readmission rate was between Medicare and Medicare 
Advantage or private payer patients. A preventable readmission was considered a 30-day 
preventable readmission for individuals hospitalized at a short-stay acute care hospital and 
experienced an unplanned readmission for CHF, PN, or AMI to an acute care hospital within 30 
days of discharge. A CHF, PN, and AMI readmission was consistent with a set of technical 
reports prepared by CMS (see Appendix 3 for list of ICD-9 codes; CMS 2011). To calculate the 
readmission rate for each condition, the numerator was the number of individuals with 30-day 
readmissions for that condition (based on ICD-9 codes), while the denominator was the total 
number of admissions for the same condition.   
Outcome: All-Cause Readmissions 
As HRRP expanded to include more conditions, more readmission outcome measures 
were incorporated into the penalty. These readmissions range from surgical readmissions for 
elective hip/knee replacements to COPD and coronary artery bypass graft surgery. Proactively, 
hospitals may have attempted to reduce HRRP readmissions and nontargeted readmissions in a 
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one-size-fits-all type of practice, anticipating that CMS might add multiple measures in the 
future. Moreover, hospitals may have attempted to reduce all-cause readmissions simply because 
it improved their overall processes and quality of care. We calculated the 30-day all-cause 
readmissions rate based on the CMS technical report (CMS 2014). There were five outcome 
variables. The first three measured the all-cause readmission rate for Medicare FFS, Medicare 
Advantage, and private payers separately. The other two outcomes were the difference between 
Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage; and Medicare FFS and private payers.  
Independent Variable 
 
HRRP is the year fixed effect. A binary variable signified as HRRP marked the years 
after 2012–2013 as a value of 1 (reference), indicating the time of implementation.3 The value 0 
was for all other years prior to 2012. As Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) 
recommended, years were collapsed into pre and post periods to produce consistent standard 
errors.  
Controls: Client and Hospital Characteristics 
We included Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for hospital market concentration as a 
control. The HHI is a measure of how evenly hospital share is distributed across hospitals in the 
market. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index values range from 0 to 10,000; an HHI closer to zero 
indicates a more competitive market, and an HHI closer to 10,000 indicates a less competitive 
market. An HHI index below 1,000 generally indicates a highly competitive market; an HHI 
between 1,000 and 1,500 indicates an unconcentrated market; a score between 1,500 and 2,500 
indicates moderate concentration; and a value above 2,500 indicates a highly concentrated 
(uncompetitive) market. We categorized this variable as a dummy variable for hospitals above or 
below median HHI. 
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We also controlled for commercial managed care penetration. We relied on data from 
Interstudy to determine county-level private managed care organization penetration. Commercial 
managed care organization penetration was defined as the number of commercial enrollees 
(Medicare Advantage and private) in a given county divided by the county’s total population. 
We then categorized commercial managed care organization penetration into quartiles (high, 
above-average, average, and low penetration). 
We also controlled for hospital structural components, such as the type of health system 
governing a hospital (Bazzoli et al. 1999). We categorized health systems as centralized, 
moderately centralized, decentralized, and independent hospitals. We also included a hospital’s 
nurse-to-bed ratio, size of the hospital, primary care and specialty physician supply, number of 
full-time nurses, and ownership. Moreover, we controlled for several patient characteristics that 
included county-level median household income, percent insured, and percent insured in 
Medicare. 
Analytic Strategy 
We used ordinary least squares (OLS) to model the predicted average of being readmitted 
within thirty days of discharge from an index admission for Medicare FFS, Medicare Advantage, 
and the privately insured. We also used a modified difference-in-difference regression model to 
test whether the effect of the HRRP was the same between Medicare, Medicare Advantage, and 
private readmissions. Our unit of analysis was hospitals. We first estimated the average change 
in readmissions after the HRRP using the baseline specification given in equations (1, 2). We 
estimated the baseline model separately for condition-specific and all-cause cohorts in Medicare 
and privately insured populations.  
(1, 2, 3) Readmitkit = β0 + β1HRRPit + β2kXit + ϒki + εkit 
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Within the regression equation, Readmitkit signified the rate of preventable readmissions 
for Medicare FFS (1), Medicare Advantage (2), or privately (3) insured patients for readmission 
k at hospital i in time period t. Models 1, 2, and 3 determined the effects of HRRP on the payers 
individually. HRRPit is a dummy variable for pre- and post-HRRP policy. Xit represents a vector 
of control variables. ϒi is a time-invariant unobserved hospital-specific effect, and εit represents a 
random error.  
(3, 4) ΔQkit = β0 + β1HRRPit + β2kXit + ϒki + εkit 
In order to assess whether the HRRP has the same effect on hospital readmission rates for 
Medicare and Medicare Advantage (3) or private payer (4) hospital readmissions, Models (3, 4) 
is the modified DD model, where ΔQkit is the difference in preventable readmission rate between 
Medicare and Medicare Advantage, or private insurance patients at hospital i in time period t. 
Results 
Sample Characteristics  
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the study sample. The Medicare CHF 
preventable readmission rate across all years was 21.3%; for private payers, it was 16.0%. The 
Medicare PN and AMI preventable readmission rates was 17.5% and 14.0%; for private payers 
10.6% and 6.4%, respectively.  
Overall, after the HRRP, hospitals experienced a modest decrease in Medicare FFS, 
Medicare Advantage, and private CHF preventable readmissions by 1.8%, 1.2%, and 1%, 
respectively (Table 2). Furthermore, this trend continued for other targeted conditions. Hospitals 
experienced a modest decrease in PN and AMI readmission rates for all payers after the HRRP. 
Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage saw a 1.1% decrease in all-cause readmissions, while 
private saw a slight increase of 0.5% after the HRRP. 
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Effects of HRRP on Targeted Readmissions 
Table 3 presents the main regression results for all models. The first results (models 1, 2, 
and 3) examined the effects of HRRP on CHF, PN, and AMI preventable readmissions on each 
payer individually, and models 4 and 5 tested whether the HRRP had the same effect on 
Medicare FFS, Medicare Advantage, private payers, respectively. In model 1, hospitals exhibited 
a significant decrease in Medicare CHF preventable readmissions post-HRRP implementation (-
0.97%, P<0.05), and models 2 and 3 indicated that there was no effect of HRRP on Medicare 
Advantage and private payer CHF preventable readmissions. Model 3 showed that there was no 
difference in CHF readmissions for Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage. Jointly, as model 4 
showed, the HRRP had a much larger effect on Medicare than on private readmissions. Medicare 
had a significant decrease in CHF readmissions relative to private (-1.73%, P<0.05).   
The next results found that post-HRRP, hospitals exhibited a decrease in Medicare PN 
preventable readmissions (-2.75%, P<0.05); and, there was no significant change for Medicare 
Advantage and private PN preventable readmissions, indicating no spillover. Jointly, the HRRP 
had a much larger effect on Medicare FFS than on private readmissions. Medicare had a 
significant decrease in PN readmissions relative to private (-3.11%, P<0.05). There was no 
difference in Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage PN readmissions. The third results found 
that the HRRP had no effect on hospital Medicare FFS, Medicare Advantage, and private AMI 
readmissions.  
Effects of HRRP on All-Cause Readmissions 
Table 4 presents the results that show that hospital Medicare FFS and Medicare 
Advantage all-cause readmissions displayed about a 1% decrease after the HRRP (P<0.05) and 
there appeared to be no spillover into private payers. Testing sought to determine whether the 
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difference between Medicare and Medicare Advantage all-cause readmissions showed no 
statistical difference between the two payers. This meant that the rate change between the payers 
was statistically equivalent to each other. In other words, both payers saw significant differences 
in all-cause readmissions; however, the effect of the HRRP was the same for each payer. This 
suggests that Medicare Advantage may have had a positive spillover due to the HRRP. Testing 
whether the HRRP had the same effect on Medicare and private readmissions found that 
hospitals had a 2.22% decrease in Medicare all-cause readmissions relative to private payers 
(P<0.05).   
Discussion 
The results from our analyses confirmed and expanded on previous literature. First, 
consistent with prior literature, we found that hospitals, on average, displayed decreased rates in 
Medicare FFS targeted readmissions after the implementation of HRRP (Carey and Lin 2015; 
Zuckerman et al. 2016; Demiralp, He, and Koenig 2017; Desai et al. 2016). We observed 
decreases in two of the three targeted readmission outcomes. Furthermore, much like other 
studies that found reductions in nontargeted readmissions (Carey and Lin 2015; Desai et al. 
2016; Demiralp, He, and Koenig 2017), we found decreases in all-cause readmissions after 
HRRP implementation.  
Our results expanded on other findings, and we found a positive spillover of the HRRP 
on Medicare Advantage. We found, on average, that the HRRP significantly affected Medicare 
FFS and Medicare Advantage all-cause readmission outcomes. We did not find any indication of 
a spillover into the private market. This was consistent with several other studies that found no 
changes in non-Medicare targeted readmissions (Carey and Lin 2015; Demiralp, He, and Koenig 
2017). Taken together, our findings, based on the insurance population in five states provided 
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evidence on HRRP’s spillover effects. This supported the view that financial implications played 
at least some role in the way hospitals managed care related to readmissions, and hospital 
providers might not be able to discern similar patient populations such as Medicare FFS and 
Medicare Advantage. Furthermore, hospital providers could provide private payer quality of care 
related to readmissions without having any negative consequences due to the HRRP. Hospitals 
must improve patient experiences and quality of care with fixed budgets and constraints, which 
may lead them to identify the optimal allocation of resources to reduce readmissions for certain 
populations.  
Our findings suggest, on average, that hospitals may not be targeting condition specific 
readmissions penalized under the HRRP. However, hospitals may be implementing readmission 
reduction initiatives that extend to a wider variation of conditions and populations that go beyond 
those targeted by HRRP. Additionally, the results found that Medicare Advantage could have 
benefitted in quality improvements and the privately insured was not negatively impacted due to 
the HRRP. This can be interpreted that hospitals are most likely not allocating resources away 
from nontargeted outcomes and different populations treated in the hospital, similar to the 
conclusions by Demirlap and colleagues (2017). Our results suggest a decrease in Medicare FFS 
and Medicare Advantage all-cause readmissions, which may be interpreted as hospitals finding it 
easier to implement a “one-size fits all” readmission reduction initiative rather than targeting 
specific conditions and populations that fall under the HRRP penalty. This all-inclusive approach 
to readmission reductions may be due to the hospitals having difficulty identifying certain 
conditions and populations that are counted in the HRRP penalty calculation.  
The study had several limitations. First, we did not see large effects of the HRRP on 
hospital Medicare readmissions and spillovers. The little to no effect could possibly be from 
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hospitals not making significant changes to their processes and care because the incentive factor 
of the HRRP was too small. In other words, the HRRP may not put substantial revenue at risk 
and thus may not be worth the hospital’s cost and time to lower the readmissions, so the hospital 
decides to pay the penalty. An informal term for this is “budget dust.” The HRRP could be 
considered budget dust because the penalty did not create enough incentive for hospitals to make 
major institutional reforms to reduce preventable readmissions. Second, although our sample was 
much larger than previous studies, the sample was limited to five states; therefore, results might 
not be generalizable. Third, there might be unobserved patient and hospital level effects that 
were not perfectly controlled for in models related to risk differences between Medicare and 
private insurance patients. Fourth, lag time and other policies around the implementation of the 
ACA and the HRRP might confound the results. Fifth, prior research suggested that targeted 
readmissions might be an unreliable estimator of hospital performance and all-cause 
readmissions could be a better metric to assess overall hospital quality of care (Thompson et al. 
2016). Therefore, our results related to targeted conditions should be interpreted with caution. 
Sixth, although we controlled for managed care penetration, we could not be sure that decreases 
in Medicare Advantage all-cause readmissions were due to the HRRP. Medicare Advantage 
plans may be congruently working with hospitals (i.e., via value-based contracts) to improve 
their beneficiaries’ quality of care related to readmissions, thus the results of HRRP may be 
overstated. Lastly, we cannot be certain that the decreases in readmission rates were due to 
genuine improvements in quality. 
In conclusion, the findings contributed to the general understanding of how policies 
motivated medical providers to improve performance and whether there were unintended 
positive or negative spillovers. Overall, the main results found evidence of a positive spillover 
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into Medicare Advantage and no effect on the privately insured. This novel study lent support to 
the notion that the HRRP decreased condition specific for Medicare FFS readmissions and all-
cause Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage readmissions. While further work was needed to 
better delineate why these relationships exist, the findings suggested that the incentive factor of 
the HRRP did make improvements in preventable readmissions for Medicare FFS and Medicare 
Advantage patients; in some cases, and did not affect care for private payers. The study extended 
beyond the normal pre and post study related to the HRRP and provided a new avenue of 
interpretation to explore ways to improve the quality of care and outcomes of patients in an often 
forgotten interconnected complex of delivery systems. 
 
 
 
 
  22 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework. 
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics. 
 30-Day Preventable Readmissions   
Congestive Heart Failure (CHF)   
Medicare 20.4% 
Private 15.5% 
Medicare Advantage 19.9% 
Pneumonia (PN)   
Medicare 16.7% 
Private 10.3% 
Medicare Advantage 16.0% 
Acute Myocardial Infraction (AMI)   
Medicare 13.3% 
Private 6.1% 
Medicare Advantage 12.7% 
All-cause   
Medicare 15.31% 
Private 7.58% 
Medicare Advantage 13.38% 
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Table 2. Changes in Preventable Readmissions, Pre- and Post-HRRP. 
Readmission Type 
Pre-HRRP 
(2009-2010) 
Post-HRRP 
(2012-2013) 
30-Day Preventable Readmissions     
Congestive Heart Failure (CHF)     
Medicare 21.2% 19.4% 
Medicare Advantage 20.4% 19.2% 
Private 15.8% 14.9% 
Pneumonia (PN)     
Medicare 17.2% 15.8% 
Medicare Advantage 16.5% 15.3% 
Private 10.5% 10.1% 
Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI)     
Medicare 13.7% 12.7% 
Medicare Advantage 13.3% 12.3% 
Private 6.4% 6.2% 
All-Cause     
Medicare 15.4% 14.4% 
Medicare Advantage 13.9% 12.8% 
Private 8.3% 8.8% 
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Table 3. Main regression results. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  
Private MA Private MA 
  Medicare (Spillover) (Spillover) (DD) (DD) 
CHF 
     HRRP -0.97%*** 0.85% -1.88% -1.73%** 1.14% 
  (0.12) (0.68) (1.55) (0.57) (1.63) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.24 0.55 -0.07 -0.28 0.38 
  (0.13) (0.32) (0.11) (0.22) (0.28) 
Observations 1,618 1,591 1,562 1,591 1,562 
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.0215 
Number of panel_id 481 476 576 476 476 
PN   
HRRP -2.75%*** 0.47% 0.32% -3.11%** -2.61% 
  (0.75) (0.82) (0.92) (1.21) (1.24) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.30 0.21 -0.02 0.12 0.48 
  (0.21) (0.30) (0.13) (0.37) (0.26) 
Observations 1,618 1,604 1,561 1,604 1,561 
R-squared 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.02 
Number of panel_id 481 480 476 480 476 
AMI   
HRRP -0.47% -0.14% -0.69% -0.44% -0.19% 
  (1.34) (0.78) (0.87) (0.40) (0.80) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0020 -0.1380 0.02 0.1974 0.10 
  (0.2770) (0.1824) (0.46) (0.1381) (0.70) 
Observations 1,601 1,512 1,509 1,508 1,505 
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Number of panel_id 480 463 466 463 466 
Reported regressions control for hospital, client, and market forces characteristics. 
Coefficients are presented in percentage.  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Effect of HRRP on all-cause readmissions. 
All-cause 
readmissions 
Medicare 
Private 
(Spillover) 
Medicare 
Advantage 
(Spillover) 
Difference 
between 
Medicare and 
Private  
Difference 
between 
Medicare and 
Medicare 
Advantage  
Difference Difference Difference (DD) (DD) 
HRRP −1.11%*** 1.11% -1.00%** −2.22%** -0.11% 
  (0.17) (0.89) (0.43) (0.80) (0.46) 
Reported regressions control for hospital, client, and market forces characteristics. 
Coefficients are presented in percentage. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 27 
 
Chapter 3: Spillover Effects Of Medicare Advantage: Does The Market Penetration 
of MA Plans Affect Hospital Care Quality? 
 
Abstract 
Objective: To investigate the spillover effects of the Medicare Advantage program on 
Medicare FFS hospital quality of care. 
 
Data Source: Health Care Utilization Project’s (HCUP) State Inpatient Database (SID) 
administrative claims data to calculate condition-specific thirty-day preventable 
readmissions. American Hospital Association (AHA) data, Interstudy Commercial 
Managed Care, and Area Health Resource File (AHRF) were used to determine hospital, 
managed care, and county-level characteristics. Medicare Advantage county-level 
payment schedules originate from CMS.  
 
Study Design: Ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable models were used 
to isolate exogenous increases in Medicare Advantage enrollment and to trace out the 
effects of greater managed care penetration on hospital quality of care. 
 
Principal Findings: We found that Medicare Advantage penetration had no effect on 
Medicare FFS readmissions as well as Medicare Advantage readmissions. There 
appeared to be no spillover from Medicare Advantage on Medicare FFS. 
 
Conclusions: As found in other studies, Medicare Advantage penetration was unlikely to 
influence Medicare FFS hospital quality of care, such as preventable readmissions. In 
contrast with earlier studies, there was no evidence that greater Medicare Advantage 
penetration was likely to reduce Medicare Advantage readmissions. 
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Introduction 
Since the mid 2000s, Medicare Advantage has seen a dramatic increase in enrollees. In 
2016, 17.6 million beneficiaries—31% of the Medicare population—were enrolled in a Medicare 
Advantage plan (Jacobson et al. 2016). This growth reflects the ongoing expansion the position 
of Medicare Advantage plays in the Medicare program. While the rise of a meaningful Medicare 
managed care sector could affect both the financial health of the program and the physical health 
of Medicare enrollees, we focused on the former. In particular, we asked the question: Does 
Medicare Advantage penetration affect utilization sustained by fee-for-service beneficiaries?  
Spillover effects refer to changes in the care delivered to fee-for-service beneficiaries that 
arise due to changes in Medicare Advantage enrollment among Medicare beneficiaries, holding 
the health status of fee-for-service beneficiaries constant. Moreover, Medicare fee-for-service 
policies have shown spillover into Medicare Advantage and vice versa. There are several reasons 
to expect spillovers. For instance, if providers tend to practice similarly for all patients, a larger 
share of Medicare Advantage may alter practice patterns for Medicare fee-for-service patients. 
While the cost effectiveness of Medicare Advantage is up to debate, several studies concluded 
that increased Medicare Advantage enrollment affected the treatment costs and utilization of 
Medicare fee-for-service patients.  
We expanded the typical spillover analysis with an examination of the impact of 
Medicare Advantage penetration on Medicare FFS beneficiaries that had preventable 
readmissions for acute myocardial infraction (AMI), health failure (HF), and pneumonia (PN) for 
Medicare FFS enrollees.1 We also analyzed the spillover effects on FFS members for all-cause 
preventable readmissions. We examined these outcomes due to prevalence, costs, and 
                                                        
1Limiting the sample to AMI, HF, and PN enabled us to examine the impact of increased MA penetration on 
disease-specific readmissions and diagnostic procedures.  
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importance to CMS as measures of hospital performance and quality of care. Furthermore, this 
study expanded on prior spillover research by examining spillovers in two different periods: 
2008 to 2010 and 2011 to 2013 in order to capture the effectiveness of MA penetration 
coexisting with and without a Medicare policy (Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program 
[HRRP]) intended for FFS preventable readmissions, and to assess whether highly concentrated 
market areas of Medicare Advantage influenced Medicare FFS readmissions prior to HRRP. 
Leveraging methods from Chernew et al. (2008) and Callison (2016), we investigated county-
level MA penetration using payment rates to MA plans in order to address the likely endogeneity 
issues inherent in changes in the MA market share (Baicker, Chernew, and Robbins 2013; 
Callison 2016). The fundamental contribution of this study was in the potential to identify 
various causal pathways through which Medicare Advantage penetration affected Medicare FFS 
preventable readmissions.  
Conceptual Framework 
Increased enrollment in MA could impact care for the traditionally insured Medicare 
beneficiaries through effects on intensive or extensive margins of patient care. The “norms 
hypothesis” developed by Newhouse and Marquis (1978) suggested that when treating patients 
with various types of health insurance, medical providers would balance payment rates so that 
practice styles were uniform, regardless of payer status (Newhouse and Marquis 1978). For 
instance, as MA enrollment rose and MA plans incentivized providers to reduce utilization, 
providers uniformly altered their care for traditional FFS patients. This resulted in a positive 
spillover via an improvement in Medicare FFS quality of care. Fee-for-service beneficiaries may 
gain from this due to MA plans being paid on a capitated basis, which makes plans more likely 
to invest in coordinated care efforts with the expectation of reduced future outlays (Baicker, 
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Chernew, and Robbins 2013). As a result, processes of care, such as post-acute care would be the 
same or improved for Medicare FFS patients. In contrast, McGuire and Pauly (1991) suggested 
providers were able to distinguish profitable and unprofitable patients and provided different 
levels of utilization of services given their patients’ payer status; this was known as the “Utility 
Maximizing Theory”(McGuire and Pauly 1991); which may result in a negative spillover.  
Several studies discussed the potential of increased MA enrollment to induce structural 
changes in health care markets primarily through capacity and utilization reductions. Yet, when a 
policy targeting FFS patients was introduced into a spillover analysis, little was known on 
whether MA enrollment amplified or condensed spillover effects in combination with a Medicare 
policy. To arrive at whether the private sector works in concert with the public sector to affect 
FFS utilization and costs, the period in which Medicare’s HRRP was implemented was used in 
the second analysis. The HRRP designates the reduction of avoidable FFS readmissions as a 
target for health care cost savings and authorizes the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) to lower payments to hospitals with high risk-standardized rates of 30-day readmissions. 
This policy was put into place as a response to control the cost associated with FFS Medicare 
readmissions. In the first year of the policy, hospitals were penalized up to 2%, second year up to 
3%, and in all other years it maintained a 3% penalty by CMS withholding Medicare inpatient 
payments.  
We investigated the impact of Medicare Advantage penetration on medical care 
utilization incurred by Medicare FFS enrollees, pre (years 2009-2010) and post (years 2012-
2013) HRRP. If the norms hypothesis held true, we would expect readmissions and its 
expenditures to have a positive spillover in that higher Medicare Advantage penetration led to 
lower preventable readmissions for FFS beneficiaries. Furthermore, there should be no 
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significant differences in preventable readmissions between Medicare FFS and Medicare 
Advantage. However, if the utility maximizing theory held true, we would expect readmissions 
to have a negative spillover—meaning that there would be significant readmission differences 
between Medicare and Medicare Advantage beneficiaries. We also examined the differences in 
spillover effects before and after HRRP in order to understand how the Medicare policy affected 
these events.  
Mechanisms of Spillover Effects 
Prior evidence suggests that the expansion of managed care plans may negatively impact 
the care of traditional Medicare FFS beneficiaries through several mechanisms. Greater managed 
care market share may make it more difficult to access hospital care due to high demand and 
providers not being able to expand output and increase the use of factors of production (Qianwei 
Shen 2015). Underperformance on process-of-care measures, which recorded the percentage of 
patients who received appropriate care for specific conditions, was often considered an indicator 
of low hospital quality of care. According to one study, individuals living in areas with higher 
levels of managed care were more likely to report problems obtaining care than areas with lower 
levels of managed care (Litaker and Cebul 2003). 
Spillover effects may also occur through a negative impact on infrastructure investments, 
such as the volume of beds, the adoption of advanced medical technology, or allocation of 
services over time. Managed care providers are assumed to have highly elastic demand so higher 
levels of managed care penetration will force managed care providers to compete with each 
other, and as a result, managed care plans may be more successful at negotiating lower prices 
with medical providers (Baker and Phibbs 2002). Additionally, lower managed care payments; 
the encouragement of practicing conservative practice patterns (Baker 2001; Heidenreich et al. 
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2002); and slowing the timing of adopting more advanced but costly technologies (Cutler and 
Sheiner 1998), requires providers to reduce cost, thereby reducing the number of specialty 
providers and the number of services provided (Baker 2001; Heidenreich et al. 2002). Because, 
all patients share hospital resources, fewer advanced technologies affect the quality of care of 
managed care and Medicare FFS beneficiaries. Prior evidence suggests that as managed care 
penetration increased, there was an inverse relationship with the number hospital beds per capita 
(Chernew 1995). Furthermore, higher levels of managed care penetration associated with lower 
levels of MRI access (Baker and Wheeler 1998) and hospital acquisition of certain medical 
technologies (Mas and Seinfeld 2008).  
To the contrary, evidence suggested that higher levels of managed care penetration were 
likely to have a positive spillover on quality of care received by Medicare FFS patients. 
According to several studies, managed care could influence physicians’ practice patterns due to 
the incentive structures of managed care payments. Given the economic assertion that, ceteris 
paribus, effort level to managed care patients was lower than that for FFS patients, as managed 
care penetration increases, patterns of care for managed care and FFS would converge (Glied and 
Zivin 2002). In other words, providers who treat mostly managed care patients appear to adopt 
an equivalent practice style for all patients, regardless of payer. Evidence also suggests that 
hospital investment in technology infrastructure can have a positive spillover. Managed care 
plans must have the ability to collect and transfer administrative data within an internal market 
(Culyer and Newhouse 2000; Qianwei Shen 2015). The information collection capacity gives 
hospitals the incentive to increase quality of care in order to attract customers. Thus, patients will 
benefit from advanced medical technology because they do not have the choice but to use more 
expensive and effective technology.  
  33 
Spillover Effect on Traditional Medicare FFS 
 Evidence suggests that managed care penetration has an effect on Medicare FFS 
expenditures and quality of care. Baicker et al. (2013) analyzed county- and MSA- level data, 
and found that Medicare FFS expenditures had a concave relationship with managed care 
penetration (Baker 2003). Baker (2003) found that as managed care penetration increased, 
Medicare FFS expenditures decreased. Chernew et al. (2008) leveraged county-level Medicare 
Advantage benchmark payment data as an instrument for Medicare Advantage penetration and 
found that every one percent increase in county-level penetration associated with a one percent 
reduction in annual spending for Medicare FFS beneficiaries.  
 Research found that higher levels of managed care penetration could lead to lower 
Medicare FFS expenditures. Despite these lower expenditures, this may result in reduced quality 
of care. Medicare FFS’ payments are set administratively; therefore, reductions in expenditures 
must result from reduced utilization. If reduced services are necessary, quality of care will 
decline. However, quality of care may improve in low expenditure areas if reduced expenditures 
result in reductions of unnecessary or inappropriate services. Therefore, it is essential to 
determine the spillover effect for measuring quality.  
 Unlike measuring expenditures, measuring quality of health care is difficult due to 
several confounding dimensions. No single variable can capture all the factors associated with 
hospital quality of care. As a result, researchers have found several ways to measure quality of 
care: outcome quality as measured by effectiveness of care, readmission rates, and mortality 
rates (Baicker, Chernew, and Robbins 2013; Callison 2016; Chernew, DeCicca, and Town 
2008); process quality as measured by access to care, preventable admissions, length of stays, 
and number of test performed (Decker 2012); and input quality as measured by the adoption of 
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advanced technologies, and staffing levels (i.e., nurses, primary care, and specialist) (Kaestner 
and Guardado 2008).  
 Evidence of system-wide spillover on quality of care is mixed. However, due to limited 
data, only a few studies provided evidence that managed care could influence the quality of care 
provided to Medicare FFS beneficiaries. One study found that managed care penetration was 
negatively associated with Medicare FFS 30-day post-admission mortality (Mukamel, 
Zwanziger, and Tomaszewski 2001). Another study found that areas with higher levels of 
managed care penetration received better quality of care for AMI admissions than areas with 
lower levels of managed care (Heidenreich et al. 2002). To the opposite effect, another study 
found managed care penetration negatively associated with Medicare FFS AMI admission 
treatment (Meara et al. 2004). Another study found that higher levels of Medicare Advantage 
penetration reduced Medicare FFS beneficiaries’ rates of hospitalization and mortality (Callison 
2016). Baicker et al. (2013) used changes in MA payment as a natural experiment and found 
Medicare Advantage penetration was not associated with fewer hospitalization, but was 
associated with lower expenditures and shorter hospital lengths of stay (Baicker, Chernew, and 
Robbins 2013). Using the same methods as Chernew et al. (2008), Callison (2015) found that 
MA penetration associated with reduced treatment intensity of Medicare FFS AMI admissions.  
Medicare Advantage Penetration Effects Medicare Advantage Quality of Care 
 Medicare Advantage enrollment has seen steady increases over the past couple decades, 
resulting in greater influence over the U.S. health delivery system. Even with rising MA 
penetration and the slow changes to Medicare FFS delivery that result from the shifting federal 
policy conditions, MA beneficiaries continue to have fewer avoidable hospitalizations—
compared to those in Medicare FFS. Furthermore, areas with high levels of MA penetration tend 
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to have lower avoidable hospitalization and readmission rates compared to Medicare FFS, even 
after controlling for selection effects and the health status of enrollees (Lemieux et al. 2012; 
Center 2016). This disparity may be due to a network effect, where managed care plans leverage 
pragmatic interventions and selectively contract with higher performing providers and refer 
patients to such providers in order to reduce avoidable hospitalizations and readmissions 
(Lemieux et al. 2012). As a result, we would expect that areas with higher Medicare Advantage 
penetration to have lower Medicare Advantage readmissions, and as a consequence, we would 
expect this to be the same for Medicare FFS, because of managed care’s influence over provider 
practice behaviors.    
Based on prior theoretical frameworks and evidence of MA spillover into Medicare FFS, 
we hypothesized that greater concentration of Medicare Advantage penetration: 
H1: will have a positive spillover into Medicare FFS quality of care. More specifically, 
the higher the MA concentration, the lower Medicare FFS readmissions will be.   
H2: will have a positive spillover into Medicare Advantage quality of care 
We also examined these spillovers before and after the HRRP, because it was important to 
control for any influences that the policy could have had on quality of care outcomes.  
Methods 
Data and Study Population Overview  
The primary data used in the analyses came from the Health Care Utilization Project’s 
State Inpatient Databases (SIDs). The SID contains detailed information on the diagnoses and 
conditions associated with readmissions and the treatments received for the universe of patients 
in a given state along with the primary source of payment, as well as basic demographic 
information such as age, gender, and race/ethnicity. Not all states differentiate specific 
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information between Medicare managed care and traditional Medicare. Therefore, these analyses 
were limited to the following states that reported specific information on Medicare plan type for 
the years 2009-2013: California, Iowa, Florida, Massachusetts, and New York. The full sample 
used in the subsequent analyses consisted of all Medicare beneficiaries from the aforementioned 
states over the age of 65 years readmitted with a primary diagnosis of AMI, HF, PN, or all-cause. 
This data was then aggregated to the hospital level. We then excluded hospitals in rural areas, 
dual-eligible individuals, individuals with planned readmissions, and hospitals with less than 30 
admissions. Data on MA and FFS enrollment originated from the Interstudy Managed Care 
Survey. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Service also provided data on county-level payment 
rates to MA plans. The Area Health Resource File provided county-level data on the supply of 
health services. More specifically, the total number of hospital beds and general practitioners and 
specialists was used as a measure of capacity and availability of medical and hospital resources.  
Outcome: Condition Specific Readmissions 
Dependent variables are presented in rates. There are six outcome variables CHF, PN, 
and AMI Medicare FFS readmission rates; and CHF, PN, and AMI Medicare Advantage 
readmission rates. A preventable readmission was considered a 30-day preventable readmission 
for individuals hospitalized at a short-stay acute care hospital and who experienced an unplanned 
readmission for CHF, PN, or AMI to an acute care hospital within 30 days of discharge. A CHF, 
PN, and AMI readmission was consistent with a set of technical reports prepared by CMS (see 
Appendix 3 for list of ICD-9 codes; CMS 2011). To calculate the readmission rate for each 
condition, the numerator was the number of individuals with 30-day readmissions for that 
condition (based on ICD-9 codes), while the denominator was the total number of admissions for 
the same condition.   
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Outcome: All-Cause Readmissions 
Hospitals may attempt to reduce all-cause readmissions simply because it improves their 
overall processes and quality of care. Furthermore, managed care plans may establish value-
based benchmarks that hospitals must meet in order to receive optimal payments. Additionally, 
reducing all-cause readmissions may be more practical for hospitals to implement, and has been 
a more reliable estimate of quality of care (Thompson et al. 2016). We calculated the 30-day all-
cause readmissions rate based on the CMS technical report (CMS 2014). There were two 
outcome variables: all-cause readmission rate for (1) Medicare FFS and (2) Medicare Advantage.  
Medicare Advantage Penetration of Plans 
We relied on data from Interstudy to determine county-level Medicare managed care 
organization penetration. Medicare managed care organization penetration was defined as the 
number of commercial enrollees in a given county divided by the county’s Medicare population. 
This was considered our endogenous variable in our IV estimation.  
Hospital-level Characteristics 
We included Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for hospital market concentration as a 
control. The HHI is a measure of how evenly hospital share is distributed across hospitals in the 
market. The HHI values range from 0 to 10,000; an HHI closer to zero indicates a more 
competitive market, and an HHI closer to 10,000 indicates a less competitive market. An HHI 
index below 1,000 generally indicates a highly competitive market; an HHI between 1,000 and 
1,500 indicates an unconcentrated market; a score between 1,500 and 2,500 indicates moderate 
concentration; and a value above 2,500 indicates a highly concentrated (uncompetitive) market. 
We categorized this as a dummy variable for hospitals above or below median HHI. 
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We also controlled for hospital structural components, such as the type of health system 
governing a hospital (Bazzoli et al. 1999). We categorized health systems as centralized, 
moderately centralized, decentralized, and independent hospitals. We also included a hospital’s 
nurse-to-bed ratio, size of the hospital, primary care and specialty physician supply, number of 
full-time nurses, and ownership.  
County-level Characteristics 
We controlled for several county-level characteristics. These included county-level 
median household income, percent insured, and percent insured in Medicare. 
Chronic Conditions 
Spillover may be affected by selection bias. According to Chernew et al. (2008), 
relatively healthier beneficiaries may be more likely to be enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans, 
and those in worse health may be left or more likely to choose Medicare FFS. As a result, this 
may create selection bias and confound the spillover results. Therefore, we introduced the 
Elixhauser Comorbidity Index to control for chronic conditions that could influence readmission 
outcomes in a hospital. This was obtained based on a patient’s index admission.  
Analytic Strategy 
The analyses goals were: (1) to estimate the effect of Medicare Advantage penetration on 
various measures of utilization for FFS Medicare patients with preventable readmissions; and (2) 
to estimate the effect of Medicare Advantage penetration effects on various measures of 
utilization prior to the year 2011 and after 2011.  
An initial model to describe association between Medicare Advantage penetration and 
utilization is as follows: 
(1) Yict = δc + ϒt + βMAct + αXict + λZct + PAYERct + εict, 
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where Y is a measure of Medicare FFS preventable readmission utilization for hospital i in 
county c in year t; MA is the county-level share of Medicare Advantage enrollment in year t; X is 
a vector of county-level characteristics; Z is a vector of hospital-level characteristics that vary 
over time including the total number of hospital beds and the total number of general 
practitioners and specialists; PAYER is the percentage of Medicare insured in a given county; δ 
and ϒ are county and year fixed effects, respectively. When we restricted the sample to 
traditional Medicare patients, the coefficient βMAct in equation (1) returned estimates of the 
spillover effect associated with Medicare Advantage penetration.  
In equation (1), ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation would likely result in biased 
estimates of the effect of Medicare managed care penetration on traditional Medicare utilization. 
This is because changes in Medicare managed care enrollment may be related to county-level 
utilization (Baker 1997; Chernew, DeCicca, Town 2008). Evidence suggests that managed care 
organizations are more likely to enter markets where costs are higher (McGuire, Newhouse, 
Sinaiko 2011; Mukamel, Zwanziger, Tomaszewski 2001). If Medicare managed care plans 
expand into areas where costs and utilization are higher, they may exploit potential cost-saving 
applications, then OLS estimates of the association between Medicare managed care and 
utilization will be biased towards zero (Chernew, DeCicca, Town 2008; Gowrisankaran and 
Town 2004).  
For this reason, the models implemented in several other studies were used to minimize 
endogeneity issues related to MA plan behavior and enrollment (Baicker, Chernew, Robbins 
2013; Callison 2015; Chernew, DeCicca, Town 2008; Gowrisankaran and Town 2004).  
Medicare Advantage payment rates from CMS were used as an instrument for Medicare 
managed care penetration. The following two-stage model is produced: 
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MAct = δ’c + ϒ’t + πRATEct + α’Xict + λ’Zct + ε’ict, 
(2) Yict = δc + ϒt + βMAct + αXict + λZct + εict, 
where RATE is the benchmark Medicare Advantage plan payment rate in county c in year t and 
the remaining variables are all as previously defined. The instrumental variable approach relied 
on the relationship between Medicare Advantage payment rates and Medicare Advantage 
enrollment (i.e., higher payment rates will attract Medicare Advantage plans that will, in turn, 
increase enrollment). These rates have been shown to be unrelated to contemporaneous changes 
in Medicare managed care enrollment (Chernew, DeCicca, Town 2008). We leveraged the two-
stage least squares methodology in two mutually exclusive ways. We first did this for the years 
2009-2010 (pre-HRRP), 2011-2013 (post-HRRP), and across all years. This was to examine how 
Medicare Advantage spillover affected Medicare FFS prior to HRRP and to what extent HRRP 
contributed to the utilization of preventable readmissions in combination with MA penetration. 
Moreover, this allowed us to examine whether HRRP was improving or worsening preventable 
readmissions and/or to what extent Medicare Advantage penetration influenced quality of care 
with and without HRRP.  
Results 
Sample Characteristics 
 To demonstrate that Medicare Advantage payments have not drastically changed over the 
course of the study, Figure 1 shows the distribution of CMS Medicare Advantage payment 
benchmarks from years 2009 to 2013. The average payment remained similar across all years. 
The average Medicare Advantage monthly payment for 2010 was about $785 and then had a 
small decline in 2013 to $765. Figure 2 demonstrates the rapid enrollment growth in Medicare 
Advantage plans for our sample of states. Medicare Advantage plans grew steadily in enrollment 
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from 2009, with an estimated additional 2 million enrollees in 2013, totaling 5.7 million. The 
average Medicare Advantage penetration rate was 30%. 
 Table 1 shows the unadjusted average readmission rate for the sample. The average 
readmission rate for CHF was 21% and 20%; PN was 17% and 15%; AMI was 13% and 11%; 
and all-cause was 15% and 13% for Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage, respectively.  Table 
2 shows the unadjusted average readmission rate across years of the sample. Unadjusted 
condition-specific readmissions for Medicare FFS saw relatively small decreases in condition-
specific and all-cause readmissions from 2009 to 2013. The largest decreases happened after 
HRRP implementation. This trend was similar for Medicare Advantage condition-specific and 
all-cause readmissions as well.  
Endogeneity Tests 
Prior research found county-level Medicare Advantage plan penetration was endogenous 
due to time-variant county-level variables correlated with Medicare Advantage plans and quality 
of care in Medicare FFS. Due to these concerns, we tested the endogeneity assumption prior to 
running the full model to conclude whether our predictors were unbiased and efficient. We tested 
the non-zero average causal effect assumption for the CMS Medicare Advantage payment 
benchmark instrument. In order to evaluate the strength of instrument, we conducted a partial F-
test after the first stage regression results (first-stage results and partial F-test located in 
Appendix A). The F-test results indicated the instrument was highly significant (P<0.01) and had 
an F-statistic higher than 10. This test suggested the instrument had a non-zero causal effect and 
was robust.  
Years 2009-2013 
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Table 3 shows our main results. The IV estimates suggest that Medicare Advantage 
penetration has no effect on hospital Medicare FFS CHF readmissions. This result is the same for 
PN and AMI readmissions as well. Furthermore, the IV estimates suggest that Medicare 
Advantage penetration has no effect on Medicare Advantage condition-specific readmissions. 
The IV results also suggest that MA penetration has a negative effect on Medicare FFS and MA 
all-cause readmissions—with each additional 1 percentage point increase in penetration, all-
cause readmissions decrease. However, this is not significant at the alpha-level of 0.05.  
Pre-HRRP (2009-2011) 
 Table 4 shows our pre- and post-HRRP results. Similar results were found prior to the 
HRRP. There appears to be no association between Medicare Advantage penetration and any 
condition-specific type of readmission for Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage prior to the 
HRRP. Moreover, these results were the same for all-cause readmissions, regardless of payer.  
Post-HRRP (2012-2013) 
Results from the post-HRRP analysis were similar to the pre-HRRP results. The IV 
estimates suggest that there was no association between penetration and condition-specific and 
all-cause readmissions for Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage. Taken together when pooling 
across separate periods, the results remain the same: our IV estimation did not find an association 
between any type of readmission and Medicare Advantage penetration.  
 
 
Discussion 
Medicare Advantage plan penetration has long been associated with changes in treatment 
costs among the traditional FFS Medicare population. The instruments underlying these cost and 
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utilization spillovers have remained unclear. This research worked to address this discrepancy by 
estimating the changes in utilization for FFS Medicare beneficiaries readmitted with AMI, HF, 
or PN, pre and post the HRRP. The overarching goal of this study was to better understand how 
Medicare Advantage penetration rates “spill over” into Medicare FFS, considering its vast 
enrollment growth in recent years. More specifically, we conducted IV estimation used from 
several other studies to examine how Medicare Advantage affected Medicare FFS quality of 
care. We conducted several analyses stratified by years while controlling for selection effects.  
Using Medicare Advantage payment rates from CMS as an instrumental variable, our 
results found no associations between Medicare Advantage penetration and Medicare FFS 
condition-specific and all-cause readmissions. Likewise, there was no association found for 
Medicare Advantage readmissions. This non-significant relationship remained the same when 
stratified pre and post HRRP implementation. Since there was no primary effect on MA 
readmissions, a spillover into Medicare FFS was even more unlikely. Our results were similar to 
those of Baicker et al. who found no MA spillover of Medicare FFS quality of care outcomes 
(hospitalizations).  
Overall, our results suggest that Medicare Advantage penetration does not affect provider 
practice patterns or the sharing of resources, such as advanced medical technology. No spillover 
may be indicative of many things. First, care related to readmissions between the two payers, 
such as post-acute care may be roughly the same. Second, Medicare Advantage may simply not 
influence provider care of beneficiary Medicare FFS readmissions. Third, the constraining of 
medical resources directly related to Medicare FFS quality of care may not be influenced by 
Medicare Advantage utilization review requirements. Although, this study found no evidence of 
a spillover, Medicare Advantage penetration may influence Medicare FFS readmissions. The 
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average penetration rate within our sample was almost 30%. As of 2017, California and Florida 
had penetration rates above 40% and several of the other states in our sample experienced 
increases of more than 10% (Jacobson et al. 2016). As Medicare Advantage enrollment growth 
continues to grow, and plans become increasingly dominant throughout the United States, 
influence over provider practice patterns and utilization control processes may create more 
pronounced spillover into Medicare FFS. An analysis with newer years of data and examining 
the association of MA penetration and readmission costs may result in different results.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of Medicare Advantage County-Level Monthly Payment Rates. 
 
Figure 2. Sample Enrollment in Medicare Plans, 2009-2013.  
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics. 
 30-Day Preventable Readmissions   
Congestive Heart Failure (CHF)   
Medicare 20.4% 
Medicare Advantage 19.9% 
Pneumonia (PN)   
Medicare 16.7% 
Medicare Advantage 16.0% 
Acute Myocardial Infraction (AMI)   
Medicare 13.3% 
Medicare Advantage 12.7% 
All-cause   
Medicare 15.31% 
Medicare Advantage 13.38% 
  
 
Table 2. Changes in Preventable Readmissions, Pre- and Post-HRRP. 
Readmission Type 
Pre-HRRP 
(2009-2010) 
Post-HRRP 
(2011-2013) 
30-Day Preventable Readmissions     
Congestive Heart Failure (CHF)     
Medicare 21.2% 19.4% 
Medicare Advantage 20.4% 19.2% 
Pneumonia (PN)     
Medicare 17.2% 15.8% 
Medicare Advantage 16.5% 15.3% 
Acute Myocardial Infraction (AMI)     
Medicare 13.7% 12.7% 
Medicare Advantage 13.3% 12.3% 
All-Cause     
Medicare 15.4% 14.4% 
Medicare Advantage 13.9% 12.8% 
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Table 3. Effects of Medicare Advantage penetration on condition specific 30-day 
preventable readmissions. 
  
Traditional Medicare 
FFS Medicare Advantage 
 
OLS IV OLS IV 
Dependent Variable (1) (1) (2) (2) 
CHF Readmission 0.02% -0.84% 0.02% -1.75% 
  (0.02) (0.71) (0.14) (1.44) 
PN Readmission -0.03% 0.07% 0.04% -0.53% 
  (0.02) (0.89) (0.18) (1.65) 
AMI Readmission 0.00% -1.25% -0.13% -1.73% 
  (0.02) (1.70) (0.22) (2.58) 
All-cause 0.01% -0.94% 0.02% -0.63% 
  (0.02) (0.49) (0.05) (0.58) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FFS, fee-for-service; OLS, ordinary least squares; IV, instrumental variable. 
Controls include indicators for age, race, gender, emergency admission, a set of 30 
comorbidities associated with increased hospital utilization, and county-level counts 
of the number of hospital beds, general practitioners, medical specialists, median 
household income, uninsured, and Medicare insurance rate.  
The IV regressions instrument for Medicare Advantage penetration rates using 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services benchmark payment rates to Medicare 
Advantage plans. 
Robust standard errors are used. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Effects of Medicare Advantage penetration on 30-day preventable readmissions pre- and 
post-HRRP. 
  Traditional Medicare FFS Medicare Advantage 
 
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Dependent 
Variable 
Pre-
HRRP 
Pre-
HRRP 
Post-
HRRP 
Post-
HRRP 
Pre-
HRRP 
Pre-
HRRP 
Post-
HRRP 
Post-
HRRP 
CHF Readmission 0.39% -3.12% -0.10% 0.06% -0.17% -1.05% 0.02% -0.94% 
  (0.25) (5.57) (0.08) (0.35) (0.39) (9.47) (0.03) (0.87) 
PN Readmission 0.09% -9.57% -0.15% 0.13% 0.11% 4.71% 0.02% 0.24% 
  (0.30) (10.28) (0.11) (0.42) (0.57) (13.64) (0.03) (0.96) 
AMI Readmission -0.43% 5.68% -0.33% 0.31% 0.12% 4.73% 0.05% -2.02% 
  (0.73) (9.77) (0.24) (0.83) (0.68) (18.76) (0.04) (1.42) 
All-cause 0.20% 1.11% -0.04% -0.02% 0.06% 2.38% -0.06% -0.02% 
  (0.14) (2.53) (0.05) (0.02) (0.19) (4.92) (0.07) (0.01) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FFS, fee-for-service; OLS, ordinary least squares; IV, 
instrumental variable. 
    Controls include indicators for age, race, gender, emergency admission, a set of 30 comorbidities 
associated with increased hospital utilization, and county-level counts of the number of hospital beds, 
general practitioners, medical specialists, median household income, uninsured, and Medicare insurance 
rate.  
The IV regressions instrument for Medicare Advantage penetration rates using Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services benchmark payment rates to Medicare Advantage plans. 
Robust standard errors are used. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 1. Test for Endogeneity and Strength of Instrument.  
 
                                                      Number of obs =     2174 
                                                      F( 13,  1681) =   191.64 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =   .807981601                Centered R2   =   0.5895 
Total (uncentered) SS   =   .807981601                Uncentered R2 =   0.5895 
Residual SS             =   .331673173                Root MSE      =   .01405 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
   MApenrate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       year1 |   .0098332    .000602    16.34   0.000     .0086526    .0110139 
      hhidum |    .005961   .0064285     0.93   0.354    -.0066478    .0185697 
 integration |  -.0013749   .0005969    -2.30   0.021    -.0025456   -.0002042 
   ownership |  -.0023933    .002532    -0.95   0.345    -.0073595    .0025729 
    nursebed |  -.0032888    .001739    -1.89   0.059    -.0066997     .000122 
     pcp_md1 |   .0073998   .0146429     0.51   0.613    -.0213203      .03612 
    spec_md2 |  -.0208477   .0051729    -4.03   0.000    -.0309938   -.0107017 
       ftern |   9.14e-06   7.53e-06     1.21   0.225    -5.63e-06    .0000239 
       bdtot |   -.000021   .0000141    -1.49   0.136    -.0000487    6.65e-06 
   income_mh |  -1.49e-06   2.48e-07    -6.00   0.000    -1.97e-06   -1.00e-06 
 ins_percent |   .5690869   .0746685     7.62   0.000      .422634    .7155399 
    mde_rate |   .0853359   .0644709     1.32   0.186    -.0411158    .2117876 
      ab_pay |  -.0000291   6.78e-06    -4.29   0.000    -.0000423   -.0000158 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Included instruments: year1 hhidum integration ownership nursebed pcp_md1 
                      spec_md2 ftern bdtot income_mh ins_percent mde_rate ab_pay 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test of excluded instruments: 
  F(  1,  1681) =    18.39 
  Prob > F      =   0.0000 
 
The result from the first stage regression where we performed a regression on our instrument and 
all exogenous variables against Medicare Advantage penetration rate. Then, we used a partial F-
test to test for endogeneity. The p-value was less that 0.00; therefore, we could reject the null 
hypothesis and concluded that endogeneity existed. Moreover, we obtained an F-statistic larger 
than 10, indicating that our instrument was not weak. 
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Chapter 4: Spillovers: Does Community Uninsurance Rates Affect Access to Behavioral 
Health Services for the Privately Insured? 
 
Abstract  
Objective: To investigate the effect of local uninsurance rates on access to behavioral health 
services for individuals with continuous employer-sponsored insurance that had mental health 
problems.  
 
Data Sources: Individual-level data from the 2011-2015 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS), the Area Health Resource File (AHRF), and the Small Area Health Insurance Estimator 
(SAHIE).  
 
Study Design: County-level and year fixed effects models estimated the effect of changes in 
uninsurance rates within communities on behavioral health access to care, measured by whether 
an individual had a reported a emergency room or inpatient visit, outpatient visit, or had a 
prescription related to mental health problems.  
 
Principal Findings: Higher community uninsurance rates were associated with fewer mental 
health related outpatient and prescription utilization among those who had continuous insurance 
coverage and had mental-health related problems. There was no association between community 
uninsured rates and emergency department and inpatient behavioral health related visits. 
 
Conclusions: High levels of community uninsurance were likely to affect behavioral health 
access for individuals with continuous insurance who had mental health related issues. Results 
suggest that long-term levels of high uninsurance in communities may lack community resources 
to expand behavioral health provider capacity.  
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Introduction 
The recent expansions of Medicaid and private insurance through the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) in conjunction with the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act allowed more 
individuals to gain access to behavioral health services. As more individuals with behavioral 
health conditions obtain a form of insurance through one of these mechanisms, a change in 
demand for behavioral health services is expected. 
However, previous studies did not show how coverage expansions affected access to 
mental health care for individuals with behavioral health conditions who already had employer 
sponsored insurance. The recent uptake of the number of insured individuals could have created 
“positive or negative spillovers” that either improved or reduced the ability of people who were 
already insured to access care. As insurance expansions and behavioral health needs increase, 
positive or negative spillovers may be more pronounced for individuals with behavioral health 
conditions who already have insurance. Negative spillovers may be due to the shortages in the 
mental health and addiction workforce not being able to meet the new demand for behavioral 
health services (Anderson 2014). Moreover, these negative spillovers could be greatest where 
there were the largest gains in the insured as a percentage of the local population (Abdus and Hill 
2017).  
Recent studies examining the spillover effects of community-level uninsured rates on 
access to care are mixed. Studies examining health reform in Massachusetts suggested that 
insurance expansions resulted in access problems, longer waiting times, increased use of the 
emergency department for nonemergency conditions, and individuals that had difficulty finding 
providers that accepted their insurance (Long and Stockley 2010; Skopec et al. 2015). After 
expansion of Medicaid in Michigan, previously insured adults experienced longer waiting times 
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to see their primary care doctor, while the newly insured had shorter waiting times (Tipirneni et 
al. 2015). Other studies found positive spillovers. Communities with lower levels of uninsurance 
were associated with timely access, and improved quality of care for insured and the uninsured 
(Cunningham 1999; Cunningham and Ginsburg 2001; Cunningham and Kemper 1998; Pagán 
and Pauly 2006), and no negative spillovers with insurance expansions (Joynt et al. 2013). Other 
studies found that growing insurance coverage or community uninsured rates had no effect on 
primary care access for those enrolled prior to initiation of policies aimed at increasing the 
uptake of insurance (Abdus and Hill 2017; Sabik 2012).  
The purpose of this study was to analyze the relationship between community uninsured 
rates and access to behavioral health services for individuals who were continuously enrolled 
throughout the year in employer-sponsored insurance. Data from the 2011 to 2015 Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), Area Health Resource File (AHRF), and the Small Area 
Health Insurance Estimation (SAHIE), allowed this study to estimate  county-level fixed-effect 
logistic models to assess whether community uninsured rates were related to behavioral health 
service access for individuals with behavioral health conditions. We hypothesized that among 
continuously insured adults with mental health problems; those living in communities with high-
uninsured rates used fewer behavioral health services compared to those in communities with 
low uninsured rates.     
Conceptual Framework 
The ways in which population-level increases in insurance coverage affected people who 
were already insured during the recent insurance expansions depended on several assumptions 
(Abdus and Hill 2017; Pagán and Pauly 2006; Kellermann and Snyder 2004). The first was 
provider capacity and willingness to offer more visits and supply additional services (Abdus and 
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Hill 2017; Pagán and Pauly 2006; Kellermann and Snyder 2004). If providers had excess 
capacity, then increased demand could easily be met, but many professionals expressed concern 
that providers could not supply enough additional services—especially behavioral health and 
primary care services (Abdus and Hill 2017; Pagán and Pauly 2006; Kellermann and Snyder 
2004; Hoge et al. 2013). A Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA) report concluded that there was major shortfall in professionals who were 
adequately trained and actively engaged in meeting the behavioral health needs of adults due to 
the workforce’s insufficient size, frequent turnover, and relatively low compensation (Hyde 
2013; Hoge et al. 2009; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 2014). The 
lack of adequate compensation, behavioral health provider capacity, and continuity between the 
patient-provider relationship has been shown to be associated with lower quality of care, less 
timely access to care and a range of services, and reduced availability of specialty care when 
needed, especially for vulnerable populations (Hyde 2013; Alegria et al. 2012; Kellermann and 
Snyder 2004). To exacerbate this capacity issue even further, psychiatrists were least likely of all 
specialists to accept insurance of all kinds (Bishop et al. 2014).  
 The second factor was the extent to which the provider market was segmented by the 
types of insurances patients carried, if any (Abdus and Hill 2017; Pagán and Pauly 2006; 
Kellermann and Snyder 2004). The third factor was the effects of ACA provisions intended to 
increase health care capacity (Abdus and Hill 2017; Pagán and Pauly 2006; Kellermann and 
Snyder 2004). The ACA set its capacity-building activities in motion before the largest insurance 
expansions occurred by providing funding to expand the safety-net; training more physicians, 
mid-level practitioners, and nurses; and encouraging more providers to work in primary care and 
in underserved areas (Decker 2012; Heisler 2013). Moreover, the ACA temporarily increased 
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Medicaid payments for some services provided by primary care providers (Zuckerman, Skopec, 
and Epstein 2017; Tipirneni et al. 2015). Overwhelmingly, the largest portion of funds directed 
at increasing capacity went towards primary care capacity, while fewer resources were available 
to expand behavioral health care capacity. A recent report from the Department of Health and 
Human Services projected that the ACA expanded benefits for 62 million Americans (Beronio et 
al. 2014), while SAMHSA concluded that every 10% increase in demand for behavioral health 
related treatment would result in the need for 6,800 additional mental health providers 
(Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 2014). Meeting such demands 
could be difficult because about 5% of the adult population reported having unmet medical needs 
in the past year (Broderick 2013). The ACA developed provisions designed to address behavioral 
health capacity through mechanisms such as grants for education, training, and loan repayment, 
with specific focus on social workers and psychologist. However, physicians and nurses are not 
eligible for these grants (Hoge et al. 2013, 2009; Eden et al. 2012). Despite the attempt to 
improve the capacity of the behavioral health delivery system funds have not been authorized for 
many of these provisions and funding appropriated to such initiatives remains small relative to 
the resources devoted to primary care capacity (Hoge et al. 2013). Moreover, as suggested by 
some reports, recent health reforms that expand coverage and benefits for behavioral health to 
improve access to mental health care do not adequately incentivize or mandate behavioral health 
provider participation (Beronio, Glied, and Frank 2014; Hoge et al. 2013).  
 The spillover effects associated with community insured rates has been a major concern 
since the early 2000’s. At the time, high and mounting uninsured rates in numerous U.S. 
communities generated concern for the potential of negative spillovers. The major concern was 
that high-uninsured rates would negatively affect access to care for both the insured and 
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uninsured. In a 2003 report, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) hypothesized that high community 
uninsured rates could affect access to or quality of care for the insured and uninsured 
(Kellermann and Snyder 2004). More recently, a 2009 IOM report summary suggested evidence 
of a negative spillover effect on the insured, and stated that high community-level rates of 
uninsurance was associated with the insured having more difficulty obtaining needed health care 
(IOM 2009). Other evidence examining community uninsured rates and access to care found that 
adults with private insurance residing in high uninsurance communities were associated with 
being less likely to have a usual source of care, seeing a specialist, and being satisfied with their 
treatment and care from doctors (Pagán and Pauly 2006). Other evidence suggested uninsured 
adults reported forgoing, postponing, or having difficulty obtaining needed medical care as a 
function of the community uninsured rate (Cunningham and Kemper 1998). The main 
implications from the aforementioned evidence was that reductions in community uninsured 
rates through expansions of insurance could generated positive spillover effects on access to care 
for those that were insured.  
To the contrary, there was a second line of research posits that coverage expansions—
such as the through the ACA—could generate negative spillover effects on access to care for the 
privately and continuously insured. Abdus and Hill (2017) hypothesized that the recent and 
immediate uptake of insurance via the ACA’s coverage expansions could negatively affect those 
that were already insured because the newly insured adults would stress provider capacity and 
decrease their access to medical care. They concluded there was little to no association between 
the recent uptake of insurance in communities and access to care (Abdus and Hill 2017). Other 
evidence found negative spillovers of the immediate uptake of insurance. The Massachusetts 
insurance expansions resulted in access problems, longer waiting times, increased use of the 
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emergency department for nonemergency conditions, and individuals with difficulty finding 
providers that accepted their insurance, but this dissipated over the course of time (Long and 
Stockley 2010; Skopec et al. 2015). Medicaid expansion in Michigan led to previously insured 
adults temporarily seeing longer waiting times to visit their primary care doctor, while the newly 
insured saw shorter waiting times (Tipirneni et al. 2015). 
The difference between these two perspectives could reflect short-term and long-term 
spillover effects of coverage expansions in the community. Short-term expansions could generate 
negative spillovers, while long-term effects might lead to positive spillovers. These short-term 
increases in community uninsured rates could lead to provisional decreases in access to care for 
those already insured, as the health care system has had insufficient time to adjust to the increase 
in demand for care. Any negative spillover effects on access to care associated with an increase 
in community insurance rates may be temporary and eventually diminish over the long term, as 
higher coverage rates of insurance increase community resources and assist in the expansion of 
provider capacity.  
Furthermore, different study designs assessing spillovers may reflect differences between 
short-term and long-term effects. Studies showed positive spillovers associated with low 
uninsured rates that generally employed a community and year fixed effects study design (Pagán 
and Pauly 2006; Sabik 2012; Daysal 2012; McMorrow 2013). By contrast, studies that found  
negative or no spillovers associated with coverage expansions employed study designs that 
examined a 1- or 2-year change in community uninsured rates (Abdus and Hill 2017).  For the 
purposes of this study, we focused on understanding the spillover effects on behavioral health 
care access that reflected more cumulative and long-term patterns of health insurance coverage 
across communities, rather than spillover effects that could be associated with short-term 
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changes in coverage rates associated with the ACA. If communities with a large uninsured 
presence exist, the capacity of providers, the predictability and stability of the insurance market, 
and the willingness of providers to see patients may suffer. The presence of high uninsured rates 
in communities could lead to lower revenue streams for providers due to lower demand for care 
or a greater proportion of uncompensated care, which could affect the insured (Kellermann and 
Snyder 2004; Sabik 2012; Pagán and Pauly 2006). As a result, communities with higher 
uninsured rates may put greater stress on public hospitals, community health centers, and other 
safety net providers (Kellermann and Snyder 2004; Sabik 2012). For providers who treat both 
insured and uninsured patients, financial constraints due to uncompensated care burden may 
reduce the number of service lines offered to patients. Therefore, communities with high-
uninsured rates may be less attractive to medical providers, thus reducing health system capacity 
and access for the insured as well as uninsured.  
We examined the cumulative long-term association between community uninsured rates 
and behavioral health access for the privately insured. We justified this approach for several 
reasons. Examining immediate short-term spillovers from a policy, such as the ACA, could result 
in little to no spillover effects. Results indicating little to no spillovers may be related to 
dedicated (or lack thereof) resources invested into provider capacity building that has not had 
adequate time to operationalize and deliver care effectively for individuals and communities. 
Thus, examining spillovers from a cumulative perspective rather than from a short-term policy-
driven analysis perspective may be better suited at capturing delayed full spillover effects of 
community uninsured rates and access to care. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
investigate the association between community uninsured rates and access to behavioral health 
care services for adults who already had and continued to have employer-sponsored insurance.  
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High community uninsured rates are associated with poorer access to care, because there 
is an insufficient supply of behavioral health providers across the United States. Therefore, we 
hypothesized that adults living in communities with higher uninsured rates—as compared to 
lower uninsured rates:  
H1: will have less behavioral health related prescription utilization. 
H2: will have less ambulatory utilization related to behavioral health issues. 
H3: and higher utilization of emergency department and inpatient utilization related to 
behavioral health problems. 
We expected that communities with higher uninsured rates would have higher emergency 
department and inpatient visits for behavioral health problems under the assumption that having 
adequate access to primary care services, such as behavioral health ambulatory care services and 
appropriate prescriptions would assist in the deterrence of preventable and unintended 
emergency department and inpatient visits.  
Methods 
Data and Sample Population Overview 
We used data from the 2011-2015 Medical Expenditures Panel Survey-Household 
Component (MEPS-HC). The MEPS is the most comprehensive source of nationally 
representative data on health care utilization, expenditures, and insurance coverage of the U.S. 
noninstitutionalized population. The MEPS-HC sample is drawn from a nationally representative 
subsample of households that participated in the prior year’s National Health Interview Survey 
(NHIS), which is based on a multi-stage area probability design that includes oversampling of 
African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2017a). 
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We used the MEPS-HC, which included three rounds per year, and we combined years 
2011-2015 as repeated cross-sections to increase the sample size and the statistical precision of 
results. During each round of in-person interviews, information on health insurance coverage, 
health care utilization, health care conditions, and health care expenditures for each person in the 
household were collected. A Medical Provider Component (MPC) collected data from a sample 
of providers identified by survey respondents to both validate and supplement missing 
information on health care utilization (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2017b). 
Respondents were also asked to complete self-administered questionnaires that included more 
detail on health status, access to care, and perceived quality of care.     
Survey response rates for the five years averaged 53%. We restricted the analysis to 
individuals continuously enrolled in employer-sponsored insurance. We also restricted the 
sample to people ages 18-64, and stratified the sample based on whether they were experiencing 
psychological distress (defined below). We identified continuously insured individuals with 
employer-sponsored insurance by monthly measures that indicated whether a person had 
insurance or not. Each individual was asked during each round whether he/she had insurance, 
and the type of insurance he/she had, for all three rounds. All years were pooled together to make 
a pooled-cross section of data.  
We combined data for the period of 2011-2015 from the MEPS-HC, the Area Health 
Resource File (AHRF), and the Small Area Health Insurance Estimation (SAHIE) dataset. The 
data from the five years of MEPS-HC conducted during this period allowed us to observe how 
behavioral health services for privately insured adults changed over the course of time after 
implementation of the ACA. Moreover, because spillover effects might have been largest in 
communities with the highest uninsured rate, we augmented MEPS-HC data with year and 
  60 
county specific measures of the percent uninsured, observed from the SAHIE. We then examined 
a subgroup with a behavioral health condition that was particularly vulnerable to potential 
spillovers: adults with severe psychological distress residing in communities with varying levels 
of uninsured rates. We examined three outcomes: emergency department and inpatient, 
prescription, and ambulatory behavioral health related utilization. 
Identification of Behavioral Health Problems 
To examine and identify people with psychological distress, we used the six item Kessler 
Psychological Distress Scale, a validated measure previously used to screen for prevalence and 
severity of mental illness (diagnosed and undiagnosed; Kessler et al. 2010). We identified people 
who had a score of nine or higher, which included people at the 75th percentile or higher of the 
sample, and considered these adults to have severe psychological distress.     
Outcomes: Identification of Behavioral Health Utilization 
The MEPS respondents were asked to report on all health care utilization, including 
inpatient care, outpatient physician and nonphysician visits, and prescription drugs. For each 
medical encounter, respondents were asked a series of questions, including the specific health 
conditions associated with the visits. Our measures of behavioral health care utilization reflect 
medical encounters and prescription drugs associated with behavioral health conditions. 
 Behavioral health conditions were based on self-reports by survey respondents, who 
were asked to identify up to five health conditions associated with each medical encounter or 
visit (including inpatient, emergency department, ambulatory, prescription drugs; Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality 2017a). These conditions were recorded by interviewers as 
verbatim text and were subsequently coded into ICD-9 and Clinical Classification Codes by 
professional coders following specific guidelines. Behavioral health conditions were based on 
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those with Clinical Classification Codes of 650-652, 656-663, and 670. Anxiety, depression, and 
other mood disorders were by far the most prevalent self-reported conditions, but our definition 
also included psychoses, personality disorders, and substance use disorders.    
We included three utilization measures in our analysis: (1) outpatient visits related to 
behavioral health conditions (both hospital-based and office-based); (2) hospital emergency 
department and inpatient utilization related to behavioral health conditions; and (3) prescription 
drugs related to behavioral health problems. All visits associated with medical encounters and 
prescription drug utilization that had Clinical Classification Codes associated with behavioral 
health conditions (see above) were considered a visit for behavioral health. One exception was 
for outpatient provider visits, which were defined as behavioral health-related if the survey 
respondent reported that the primary reason for the visit was psychotherapy, or the provider seen 
was a psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, or other type of mental health counselor.   
Independent Variable: Community Uninsured Rates 
 We extracted the county-level uninsured rate from the AHRF. The AHRF pulls county-
level measures from a variety of federal data sources and obtains the county-level uninsured rates 
from the SAHIE. The SAHIE estimates are conducted by the Census Bureau, which provides 
local-area estimates of the proportions of population that are uninsured (Bureau 2017). We used 
the SAHIE uninsured rates pulled from the AHRF versus the American Community Survey 
(ACS), because it allowed us to make estimates for counties with less than 60,000 people. We 
computed the annual proportion of uninsured by including adults ages 18 to 64 without insurance 
and categorized them into low, average, and high uninsured areas. County areas were defined as 
communities, if the communities were large enough to support estimates for all of the period 
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2011-2015. Community area uninsured rates from the AHRF were then merged with MEPS-HC 
data by county.   
Controls: Other sociodemographic, health status, provider capacity, and health behavior 
variables 
Both the descriptive and multivariate analysis described below included key 
sociodemographic characteristics, including age, gender, race/ethnicity (white, African-
American, Hispanic, Asian, other), and education (high school graduate or less than high school). 
Low income was defined as having a family income less than 200% of the federal poverty level; 
moderate income was defined as having family income between 200 and 400% of the federal 
poverty level; high income was defined as having family income greater than 400% of poverty. 
Self-reported general health status was reported as a person having excellent or very good, 
average, and fair or poor health. We controlled for county-level employment and  provider 
capacity variables. We also controlled for the supply of county-level primary care by using the 
simple counts of physicians, psychiatric care, and office-based psychiatric care within a given 
community.  
Analytic Strategy 
We followed a similar analytical approach as Pauly and Pagán (2006), Sabik (2012), 
Daysal (2012), and McMorrow (2013) where we used county-level and year fixed-effects 
logistic regression models to control for community-area and year factors to examine the effects 
of living in high or low uninsured communities and its association with behavioral health 
services over the course of time. For each access to care behavioral health utilization measure, 
we regressed on community-area adult uninsured rate. Each logistic regression was stratified by 
the little to no distress sample and whether a person had severe psychological distress (Kessler 
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score of nine or above). We then converted our regression results to predicted average 
probabilities for ease of interpretation.  
(1) E(Yi,c,t = 1) = f (α + β1Uninsuredc,t +  β2Year1 + β3X1 + β4County Supply1 + β4County1 + 
εi,c,t) 
The dependent variables in the equation (Yict) are binary measures of health care 
utilization individual i, residing in community c, and in year t. The variable (Uninsuredct) is a 
categorical variable, categorized into terciles, which takes the value 0 if individual i resided in a 
low uninsured rate community area, the value 1 if individual i resided in an average community 
uninsured rate area, and 2 if individual i resided in the highest community uninsured rate area. 
Year1 is the year fixed-effect.  X is the vector of individual characteristics (age, sex, 
race/ethnicity, employment status, education, and health status). County Supply is a vector of the 
number of physicians practicing in a given community (primary care physicians, psychiatrists, 
and office-based psychiatrists). County is the county fixed effect. Including these measures 
allowed us to estimate a spillover of whether the association between behavioral health 
utilization varied by the community-level uninsured rate.  
Survey weights were used to produce nationally representative estimates, to correct for 
the unequal probabilities of selection in the MEPS sample, and to correct for survey non-
response. The MEPS public use files included variables to obtain weighted estimates and 
corrected standard errors that took into account the complex survey design, using the Taylor-
series linearization approach. Because MEPS public use files use a common variance structure 
beginning in 2002, the weight variables for the years 2011-2015 are combined in order to 
produce weighted estimates with the pooled data, as recommended in the MEPS survey 
documentation (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2017a). All reported standard 
  64 
errors and tests of statistical significance accounted for the complex survey design. We 
conducted all analyses using STATA 14.2.   
Results 
Prevalence of Severe Psychological Distress 
 Of adults in the sample with continuous employer-sponsored insurance identified in 
Table 1, those with little to no psychological distress comprised about 33% and those with severe 
psychological distress comprised about 5% of the total sample. Overall, unadjusted estimates in 
Table 2 indicated that adults with psychological distress had higher prevalence of emergency 
department and inpatient, ambulatory, and prescription behavioral related utilization than those 
with little to no distress. Those who had severe distress had about six percentage points more 
ambulatory care visits, 10 percentage points more prescriptions, and about one percentage point 
more emergency department and inpatient visits. There was little to no difference between 
samples in community uninsured rates. Adults with severe distress lived in areas with higher 
supply of primary care physicians (Mean: 847.91) psychiatric physicians (Mean: 161.34), and 
office-based psychiatric physicians (Mean: 114.25) compared to those with little to no distress. 
Both samples had slightly more females than males. The majority of both samples were also 
White. On average, those with severe distress were less educated with approximately 7% that 
had less than a high school education; however, 5% of those with little to no distress had less 
than a high school education. Furthermore, 36% of adults with severe distress graduated from 
college, whereas those with little to no distress amounted to about 42%. Both samples were 
relatively similar in age. Income as a percent of the federal poverty line was also similar between 
both samples; however, the prevalence of adults that were less than 200% of the federal poverty 
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line who had severe distress was slightly higher. People who had little to no distress were more 
likely to be employed and to report being in excellent or very good health.  
 
Characteristics of Community Uninsured Rate and Behavioral Health Services 
 Table 3 displays the characteristics of adults that live in communities with low, average, 
or high-uninsured rates that use behavioral health services. Focusing on the last column of the 
table, adults with severe distress in communities with the highest uninsured rates as compared to 
those in the lowest, had less ambulatory visits (9.99%), about the same amount of prescriptions 
(21.44%), and more emergency department and inpatient visits (1.40%). In general, the 
prevalence of emergency department and inpatient visits, ambulatory care, and prescriptions was 
much higher for those with severe distress across all communities than those with little to no 
distress.  
 Community Uninsured Rate and Behavioral Health Access 
 Full logistic regression results are presented in Appendix I. We converted these results to 
probabilities for ease of interpretation. Table 4 presents the predicted average probabilities of our 
full logistic regression results. Overall, adults with severe psychological distress in communities 
with the highest uninsured rates reported a lower probability of prescriptions and ambulatory 
visits than those in communities with the lowest uninsured rate. Results indicated that adults with 
severe psychological distress that resided in communities with average and the highest uninsured 
rates were prescribed behavioral health related medications 7 percentage points (p<0.05) and 
8.28 percentage points (p<0.1) less than those who lived in the lowest uninsured communities, 
respectively. This trend continues with ambulatory care as well. Adults that live in communities 
with an average uninsured rate reported utilizing outpatient or office-based care 8.57 percentage 
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points (p<0.01) less than those in the lowest uninsured communities. Adults living in counties 
with the highest uninsured rate saw even a larger disparity—they reported 10.58 percentage 
points (p<0.01) less outpatient or office-based visits. Adults living in the highest uninsured areas 
saw about 5% higher probability of emergency department and inpatient visits relative to 
communities with the lowest uninsured rate; however, this was not significant. For individuals 
with little or no psychological distress, there were no statistically significant differences between 
community uninsured rate and behavioral health care utilization.  
Discussion 
Our results found that high levels of community uninsurance and access to behavioral 
health services did not only affect the uninsured, but the insured as well. There appeared to be a 
negative spillover in communities with the highest uninsured rates. The privately insured 
reported lower probabilities of prescription utilization and ambulatory care for behavioral health 
related issues. We found similar results by Pauly and Pagán (2006), but different than Abdus and 
Hill (2017) and other studies that examined the spillover effects of the ACA coverage 
expansions. Like Pauly and Pagán (2006), Sabik (2012), Daysal (2012), and McMorrow (2013), 
our year and county fixed-effects study design might reflect the long-term cumulative effects of 
living in high and low uninsured communities; whereas, Abdus and Hill and other studies 
assessed the short-term changes in utilization that occurred when a community experienced a 
change in coverage over a 1- or 2-year period. A short-term increase in the community insurance 
rate could lead to a short-term decrease in access for those who already insured, as the health 
care system had insufficient time to adjust to the increased demand for care. However, any 
negative spillover effects on access associated with an increase in community insurance rates 
could be temporary and eventually reversed over the long term, as higher coverage rates were 
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associated with increases in community resources. As demonstrated by our results, communities 
with high uninsured rates affected privately insured individuals’ access to behavioral health 
services negatively, which could be a symptom of insufficient provider capacity and inadequate 
community resources. The implication is that over the long term, coverage expansions have 
positive spillover effects on the continuously insured as higher coverage rates increase 
community resources and lead to an expansion in system capacity.     
In greater detail, the negative spillover effects in high-uninsured communities may have 
occurred for several reasons. First, the thin profit margins per service that accompany a large 
uninsured presence (Pagán and Pauly 2006; Sabik 2012; Chen, Lo Sasso, and Richards 2018). 
Second, in communities with high-uninsured rates the uncertain mix of privately uninsured and 
insured adults could add unpredictability and instability to the respective markets (Chen, Lo 
Sasso, and Richards 2018; Pagán and Pauly 2006). Third, the return on investment for primary 
care specialties such as psychiatry may be negative and a far more risky discipline to enter than 
other specialties (Chen, Lo Sasso, and Richards 2018). These reasons create a scenario that may 
be detrimental to behavioral health provider capacity, reduce the demand and access for 
behavioral health services, and disincentivize behavioral health providers from seeing patients 
and offering more services.  
Policymakers and medical professionals should be cognizant that the lack of behavioral 
health supply- and demand-side incentives may have unintended consequences that may also 
affect individuals with insurance, especially those with behavioral health needs. This study 
demonstrates that high levels of community uninsured rates can have negative effects on 
privately insured individuals’ behavioral health service access. Supply-side policies that 
influence demand should be developed to bolster behavioral health provider capacity. Evidence 
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of supply-side financial incentives such as provider bonuses, benefit expansions, and payment 
increases for specific services have been documented as having positive effect on providers 
entering less-desired specialties, improving provider capacity in high need areas, and increasing 
access to medical care (Chen, Lo Sasso, and Richards 2018). As a result, resources should be 
targeted to communities with the highest uninsured rates so that individual access to behavioral 
health services is improved.  
This study had several limitations. First, we used the Kessler scale as a proxy to identify 
whether an individual had a behavioral health condition. We used this scale because of the 
endogeneity issues between identifying our sample by using behavioral health conditions at a 
provider visit and measuring behavioral health utilization. Second, there could be under-
reporting of diagnoses for behavioral health problems and over-estimates of treated cases. Third, 
a larger sample would yield more precise estimates to detect differences across community 
uninsured rates and behavioral health access. Fourth, there could be measurement error of the 
community uninsured rate in the SAHIE. Fifth, community uninsured rates continued to decline 
past 2015; therefore, spillovers on the continuously insured may have changed. Lastly, we could 
not be completely sure that disparities in behavioral health access in communities with higher 
uninsured rates were due to lower provider capacity and payments. 
Adults with psychological distress and that have continuous employer-sponsored 
coverage, in communities with higher levels of the uninsured, was associated with a negative 
spillover. On average, people were less likely to use prescriptions, and to use ambulatory 
services to receive services related to their behavioral health. There appears to be no statistically 
significant differences in county-level uninsured rates and emergency department and inpatient 
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utilization. Although, these individuals have insurance, their access to behavioral health related 
medication and ambulatory services were less likely if they lived in a highly uninsured area.  
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Table 1. Sample Summary. 
Continuously enrolled in employer-sponsored insurance (n=181,529) 
Little no psychological distress 33.04% 
Severe Psychological Distress 5.43% 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics. 
  Little to no distress Severe Distress 
  
% % 
Mean Mean 
Behavioral Health Utilization     
Emergency Department/Inpatient 0.27% 1.12% 
Prescription 11.48% 21.09% 
Ambulatory 4.19% 10.66% 
Community Uninsured Rate1     
Low 37.37% 38.07% 
Average 34.28% 34.97% 
High 28.35% 26.96% 
County Supply-Side Variables     
Primary Care Physicians  778.27 847.91 
Psychiatric Physicians 144.82 161.34 
Office-based Psychiatric Physicians 102.90 114.25 
Controls     
Sex     
Male 49.18% 48.13% 
Female 50.82% 51.87% 
Education     
LT High school 3.56% 6.75% 
High School or GED equivalent  23.45% 25.57% 
Some College/Associates or Vocational 30.53% 31.51% 
College graduate 42.45% 36.17% 
Race/Ethnicity      
White 57.89% 55.20% 
Hispanic 11.04% 12.08% 
Black 9.01% 8.95% 
Asian 20.00% 21.58% 
Other 2.06% 2.20% 
Age     
  71 
Table 2. Summary Statistics. 
  Little to no distress Severe Distress 
  
% % 
Mean Mean 
18-34 29.62% 31.68% 
35-49 33.89% 32.76% 
50-64 36.50% 35.57% 
Income (percent of federal poverty line)     
LT than 200% 9.38% 12.17% 
200%-400% 30.95% 32.99% 
GT than 400%  59.67% 54.84% 
Employment 86.01% 78.25% 
General Health Status     
Excellent or Very Good 70.20% 58.63% 
Good 23.54% 27.62% 
Fair or Poor 6.26% 13.75% 
Year     
2011 20.20% 20.77% 
2012 20.53% 17.41% 
2013 19.82% 18.25% 
2014 19.66% 21.56% 
2015 19.79% 22.01% 
1Community Uninsured Categories are defined as follows: 
Low: LT 14.44% 
Average: 14.44%-21.06% 
High: GT 21.06% 
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Table 3. Behavioral Health Services by Community Uninsured Area. 
  Little to no distress Severe Distress 
Community Uninsured Rate     
Emergency Department/Inpatient     
Low 0.24% 0.88% 
Average 0.35% 1.17% 
High 0.21% 1.40% 
Prescription      
Low 12.27% 21.25% 
Average 11.94% 20.65% 
High 9.89% 21.44% 
Ambulatory     
Low 4.94% 11.62% 
Average 4.28% 10.13% 
High 3.10% 9.99% 
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Table 4. Adjusted Probabilities: Stratified by Psychological Distress. 
Variable 
Little to no 
distress 
Severe 
distress 
Utilization Measures 
Predicted 
Average 
Predicted 
Average 
Emergency Department/Inpatient 
Low community-level uninsured rate (reference) 0.68% 3.40% 
  (0.21) (1.56) 
Average community-level uninsured rate 1.40% 2.27% 
  (0.32) (0.60) 
High community-level uninsured rate 1.10% 8.34% 
  (0.61) (3.59) 
RX Use 
Low community-level uninsured rate (reference) 11.77% 28.12% 
  (0.07) (2.23) 
Average community-level uninsured rate 12.79% 21.12%** 
  (0.53) (1.11) 
High community-level uninsured rate 11.92% 19.84%* 
  (0.97) (2.36) 
      
Outpatient/Office Based  
Low community-level uninsured rate (reference) 4.76% 20.25% 
  (0.41) (2.77) 
Average community-level uninsured rate 5.59% 11.67%*** 
  (0.41) (1.08) 
High community-level uninsured rate 5.59% 9.62%*** 
  (0.89) (1.51) 
1Community Uninsured Categories are defined as follows:   
Low: LT 14.44% 
  Average: 14.44%-21.06% 
  High: GT 21.06% 
  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 significantly different from reference group 
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Appendix 2. Regression Results: Association Between Community Uninsurance and 
Behavioral Health Services.  
  
Emergency 
Department/Inpatient  Ambulatory Prescription 
  
Little to no 
distress 
Severe 
Distress 
Little to no 
distress 
Severe 
Distress 
Little to no 
distress 
Severe 
Distress 
Odds Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio Odds Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio Odds Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio 
Community 
Uninsured Rate1             
Low (Reference) 
  
        
Average 2.17 0.61 1.20 0.44*** 1.11 0.60*** 
  (1.11) (0.51) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
High 1.66 3.36 1.28 0.34*** 1.02 0.54* 
  (1.45) (3.99) (0.32) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) 
County Supply-Side 
Variables             
Primary Care 
Physicians  1.00 1.03** 1.00 0.99** 1.00 1.00 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Psychiatric 
Physicians 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.01 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Office-based 
Psychiatric Physicians 0.93** 0.86** 1.00 1.02 0.99 0.99 
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Controls             
Sex             
Male (Reference) 
  
        
Female 1.98** 1.57 1.55*** 1.94*** 2.12*** 2.01*** 
  (0.59) (0.60) (0.15) (0.26) (0.13) (0.24) 
Education              
LT High school 
(reference) 
  
        
High School or 
GED equivalent  1.09 5.19*** 1.06 1.66 1.19 2.00*** 
  (0.74) (3.68) (0.37) (0.63) (0.21) (0.56) 
Some 
College/Associates or 
Vocational 0.68 4.52*** 1.51 1.88* 1.37** 2.45*** 
  (0.45) (3.57) (0.53) (0.67) (0.21) (0.67) 
College graduate 0.74 3.19 1.98 3.29*** 1.36* 3.03*** 
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Appendix 2. Regression Results: Association Between Community Uninsurance and 
Behavioral Health Services.  
  
Emergency 
Department/Inpatient  Ambulatory Prescription 
  
Little to no 
distress 
Severe 
Distress 
Little to no 
distress 
Severe 
Distress 
Little to no 
distress 
Severe 
Distress 
Odds Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio Odds Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio Odds Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio 
  (0.52) (2.78) (0.69) (1.19) (0.21) (0.88) 
Race/Ethnicity              
Hispanic 
(Reference) 
  
        
White 1.62 3.17** 2.08*** 
2.012**
* 2.18*** 2.56*** 
  (0.75) (1.71) (0.31) (0.43) (0.23) (0.54) 
Black 0.76 0.86 0.82 0.59** 0.51*** 0.45*** 
  (0.44) (0.64) (0.16) (0.16) (0.07) (0.12) 
Asian 1.49 0.57 1.36** 0.74 1.30* 1.22 
  (0.78) (0.39) (0.21) (0.19) (0.15) (0.28) 
Other 2.14 2.13 1.59 1.00 1.30 2.21** 
  (2.32) (1.81) (0.50) (0.39) (0.37) (0.76) 
Age             
18-34 (Reference) 
  
        
35-49 0.69 0.31*** 1.04 0.97* 1.17* 1.19 
  (0.24) (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.10) (0.18) 
50-64 0.67 0.14*** 0.98 0.71** 1.55*** 1.27* 
  (0.20) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) 
Income (percent of 
federal poverty line)             
LT than 200% 
(Reference) - -         
200%-400% 1.00 1.05 1.21 0.99 0.97 0.83 
  (0.46) (0.57) (0.21) (0.19) (0.10) (0.14) 
GT than 400%  0.64 1.07 1.13 1.07 1.00 0.77 
  (0.34) (0.60) (0.20) (0.22) (0.11) (0.14) 
Employment 1.91 0.68 0.64*** 0.40*** 0.73*** 0.52*** 
  (0.80) (0.27) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) 
General Health 
Status             
Excellent or Very 
Good (Reference) 
  
        
Good 2.61*** 7.38*** 1.74*** 3.05*** 1.73*** 2.95*** 
  (0.76) (3.31) (0.17) (0.48) (0.10) (0.37) 
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Appendix 2. Regression Results: Association Between Community Uninsurance and 
Behavioral Health Services.  
  
Emergency 
Department/Inpatient  Ambulatory Prescription 
  
Little to no 
distress 
Severe 
Distress 
Little to no 
distress 
Severe 
Distress 
Little to no 
distress 
Severe 
Distress 
Odds Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio Odds Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio Odds Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio 
Fair or Poor 4.77*** 
15.38**
* 2.73*** 3.97*** 3.20*** 5.03*** 
  (1.65) (6.82) (0.44) (0.68) (0.31) (0.73) 
Year             
2011 (Reference) 
  
        
2012 1.23 1.95 0.71*** 0.84 0.73*** 0.66*** 
  (0.51) (1.06) (0.07) (0.17) (0.06) (0.11) 
2013 0.86 2.27 0.66*** 0.72 0.72*** 0.67** 
  (0.46) (1.39) (0.08) (0.18) (0.07) (0.12) 
2014 1.36 1.08 0.86 0.58** 0.81** 0.60*** 
  (0.80) (0.76) (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.12) 
2015 1.13 1.13 0.75* 0.39*** 0.72*** 0.43*** 
  (0.76) (0.88) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) 
Constant 0.04 0.00*** 0.74*** 0.23 0.02*** 0.01*** 
  (0.28) (0.00) (0.02) (1.57) (0.00) (0.00) 
1Community Uninsured Categories are defined as follows: 
Low: LT 14.44% 
Average: 14.44%-21.06% 
High: GT 21.06% 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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